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INTRODUCTION 
Several federal statutes criminalize conduct by foreigners that has no 
relation to the United States.  Some of these measures purportedly exercise 
Congress’s power to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed 
on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations.”1  This raises a 
serious and previously unexplored question about the meaning and jurisdic-
tional breadth of the Define and Punish Clause: Does the clause authorize 
Congress to legislate for the rest of the world? 
This question intersects with several pressing controversies.  As Euro-
pean nations have increasingly begun to exercise universal jurisdiction over 
various crimes, there is pressure on the United States to follow suit.2  Aliens 
have increasingly turned to U.S. courts to adjudicate purely foreign dis-
putes.3  Also, the interplay between international law and constitutional law 
has become a much debated issue.4  A better understanding of the Define 
and Punish Clause will illuminate each of these controversies:5 in one 
 
1  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (“Clause Ten” or the “Define and Punish Clause”).  When speaking 
of particular parts of the clause, this Article will refer to the high seas power as the “Piracies and Felo-
nies” provision and to the law of nations power as the “Offenses” provision. 
2  See, e.g., FIONA MCKAY, REDRESS TRUST, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN EUROPE: CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTIONS IN EUROPE SINCE 1990 FOR WAR CRIMES, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, TORTURE AND 
GENOCIDE (1999), available at http://www.redress.org/publication/UJEurope.pdf; LUC REYDAMS, 
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL PERSPECTIVES (2003); David B. Rivkin, Jr. 
& Lee A. Casey, Op-Ed., Europe’s Runaway Prosecutions, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2007, at A19 (dis-
cussing the use of universal jurisdiction by European nations in attempting to prosecute American offi-
cials for alleged violations of international law). 
3  See, e.g., Belhas v. Ya’alon, 515 F.3d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (involving suit by Lebanese citizens 
against Israeli defense officials concerning military actions in southern Lebanon); Khulumani v. Barclay 
Nat’l Bank Ltd., 509 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2007) (involving suit by South African nationals against U.S. and 
foreign corporations for abetting apartheid); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (allow-
ing suit by Paraguayan nationals against former Paragyuan military officials for torture committed dur-
ing that country’s civil war); see also Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: 
What Piracy Reveals About the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 111 (2004). 
4  See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 43 
(2004); Eugene Kontorovich, Disrespecting the “Opinions of Mankind”: International Law in Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 261 (2005); John O. McGinnis, Foreign to Our Constitution, 
100 NW. U. L. REV. 303 (2006).   
5  United States v. Suerte, 291 F.3d 366, 375 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that the Piracies and Felonies 
power is “the only specific grant of power to be found in the Constitution for the punishment of offenses 
outside the territorial limits of the United States” (internal quotation marks omitted)).   
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breath the clause addresses universal jurisdiction (piracies), extraterritorial 
crimes (felonies on the high seas), and violations of international law.  
This Article demonstrates that the Define and Punish Clause limits 
Congress’s power to criminalize conduct that lacks a U.S. nexus.  Two pos-
sible interpretations emerge from examining the evidence.  At most, Con-
gress can legislate universally only when international law has made 
punishment of the regulated conduct universally cognizable.  In the narrow-
est interpretation, Congress’s universal jurisdiction powers under the clause 
are restricted solely to piracy.  In either case, the restriction comes not from 
the independent force of international law but from the Constitution itself, 
which incorporates international law by reference in Clause Ten.  This con-
clusion suggests that at least one important criminal law currently in force 
and several others pending in Congress exceed Congress’s Article I compe-
tence.  Moreover, it has cautionary implications for Alien Tort Statute 
(ATS) cases against foreign officials for abuses committed against their 
own nationals. 
Understanding the limits on universal jurisdiction under the Define and 
Punish Clause requires exploring its particularly obscure “Piracies and 
Felonies” provision.6  This inquiry also has important ramifications for the 
scope of the more often used “Offenses” power.  Because maritime matters 
were so central to the life of the early Republic, almost all discussions of 
universal jurisdiction from the Founding Era until the twentieth century in-
volved matters on the “high seas,” and thus primarily implicate those pow-
ers.  The Piracies and Felonies provision has direct modern relevance: 
Congress has relied on it to enact America’s most used criminal universal 
jurisdiction statute, the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA).7 
No scholarship has examined the meaning of the Piracies and Felonies 
provision.8  (It is wonderful that this can still be said of any constitutional 
provision.)  Clause Ten’s other element, the power to “define and punish 
. . . Offences against the Law of Nations,” has been recently described as 
 
6  See United States v. Biermann, 678 F. Supp. 1437, 1445 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (“The courts of the 
United States have not had many occasions to interpret this constitutional provision.”); HERITAGE 
FOUND., THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 126 (Edwin Meese III et al. eds., 2005) (describ-
ing the clause’s meaning as “not . . . controversial”); Curtis A. Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. 
Law, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 323, 337 (“[T]he scope of the Define and Punish Clause is unclear . . . .”).  
7  See United States v. Madera-Lopez, 190 Fed. App’x 832, 835–36 (11th Cir. 2006) (rejecting the 
contention that the Piracies and Felonies power does not authorize universal jurisdiction over drug of-
fenses).   
8  Professor Crosskey discusses the provision in some detail, but from a separation of powers per-
spective.  See 1 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF 
THE UNITED STATES 443–58 (1953).  He sees the provision as giving Congress authority that, in British 
law, because of its connection to the admiralty, would have resided with the executive.  Id. at 445–46; 
see also A. Mark Weisburd, Due Process Limits on Federal Extraterritorial Legislation?, 35 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 379, 419–22 (1997) (reading United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 186 
(1820), to mean that Congress lacks constitutional authority to punish purely foreign conduct not subject 
to universal jurisdiction under international law).  The Furlong case is discussed infra Part IV.C.3. 
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the least “understood”9 and most “understudied”10 constitutional provision.11  
Surely its even more neglected sibling, the Piracies and Felonies provision, 
demands analysis.  
The inquiry begins with the text itself, which contains no explicit juris-
dictional limits.  However, Clause Ten’s doubly redundant structure has 
important implications for the permissibility of universal jurisdiction when 
considered against the legal background of 1789.  Piracy was both a “Fel-
on[y]” and an “Offense[] against the Law of Nations.”  Yet the powers are 
mentioned separately, drawing attention to the one feature that distin-
guished piracy from all other felonies and offenses.  Piracy was the only 
universal jurisdiction crime.12  By separating out the jurisdictionally unique 
offense, the text suggests a separate jurisdictional treatment for it.  When 
dealing with piracy, Congress can use the uniquely broad jurisdictional 
scope associated with that offense.  However, this jurisdiction does not ex-
tend to the other high seas felonies and international law crimes punishable 
under Clause Ten.  If Congress could apply universal jurisdiction to regular 
high seas felonies, it would obliterate the only legal distinction between pi-
racies and felonies. 
Going beyond the text, this Article brings together a wide variety of 
sources—judicial, political, and legislative—bearing on the jurisdictional 
scope of Clause Ten.13  This Article considers the views of the Framers and 
other important interpreters from the early Republic in all three branches of 
government. 
The view that the Congress cannot use Clause Ten as a basis for uni-
versal jurisdiction over any crime except piracy had support from such lead-
ing jurists as James Wilson (a drafter of the Constitution), John Marshall, 
and Joseph Story.  Their discussions of the clause arose in the context of 
major historical dramas—the extradition of a mutineer to the British in 
1799, which nearly lead to the congressional censure of President Adams; 
the revolt of Spain’s South American colonies in the 1810s, which lead to a 
 
9  J. Andrew Kent, Congress’s Under-Appreciated Power to Define and Punish Offenses Against the 
Law of Nations, 85 TEX. L. REV. 843, 847 (2007). 
10  Julian G. Ku, Structural Conflicts in the Interpretation of Customary International Law, 
45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 857, 860 (2005). 
11  The clause has in recent years attracted attention, particularly for its role in granting extraterrito-
rial powers to Congress.  See Kent, supra note 9, at 848, 848 n.19 (citing an earlier work and noting a 
“lack of in-depth scholarship about the Clause”); Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Con-
gress’s Power to “Define and Punish . . . Offenses Against the Law of Nations”, 42 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 447, 453–54 (2000); Zephyr Rain Teachout, Note, Defining and Punishing Abroad: Constitutional 
Limits on the Extraterritorial Reach of the Offenses Clause, 48 DUKE L.J. 1305, 1305 (1999).  
12  See Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow Founda-
tion, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 183, 190–205 (2004) (discussing piracy’s status as the prototypical universal 
jurisdiction crime). 
13  Cf. Bradley, supra note 6, at 335 (“Although the founders may not have envisioned that this 
power would be used to regulate conduct on foreign soil, I am not aware of any evidence showing that 
they meant to disallow such power if and when international law evolved to allow for its exercise.”). 
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period of maritime lawlessness; and the broad Anglo-American campaign 
to abolish the slave trade.  By 1820, both Congress and the Supreme Court 
had rejected universal jurisdiction over anything but “piracies.”  When the 
question arose again in recent decades, legislators and jurists simply ne-
glected to ask whether the Define and Punish power had jurisdictional lim-
its.14   
 
 * * * 
 
The Article’s conclusions have implications for many of the nation’s 
universal jurisdiction laws.  The sole source of universal jurisdiction used 
by the United States today is the MDLEA.15  This statute extends U.S. nar-
cotics laws to foreigners found with contraband on foreign vessels any-
where in the world, regardless of their destination.  Aside from the 
MDLEA, U.S. law allows for universal jurisdiction in a few other situa-
tions.16  It proscribes giving “material support” to terrorist groups17 even 
when neither the support nor the group itself has any connection to Amer-
ica.18  The material support law was recently enlarged to apply U.S. narcot-
ics laws universally to any drug trafficking anywhere, if its proceeds 
support terrorism.19  Furthermore, Congress recently extended universal ju-
risdiction to the use or recruitment of child soldiers, and recent legislative 
 
14  One can only speculate about the reasons for the oversight.  The greatly expanded scope of Con-
gress’s power since the 1930s may make one forget that it still needs an Article I basis.  In addition, the 
growing acceptance of universal jurisdiction in international law may have distracted attention from 
whether the Constitution authorizes it.  Finally, the great decline in the admiralty docket might have led 
people to miss what would have previously been more obviously suggested by the juxtaposition of “Pi-
racies” and “Felonies.” 
15  46 U.S.C.A. §§ 70501–07 (West 2008); see also 46 U.S.C.A. § 70502(c)(1)(A), (C) (West 2008) 
(establishing jurisdiction over vessels “without nationality” and vessels “registered in a foreign nation 
where the flag nation has consented or waived objection to the enforcement of United States law by the 
United States”).   
16  Piracy, the original universal jurisdiction offense, remains universally cognizable under current 
states.  See 18 USC § 1651 (2006). 
17  18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2006). 
18  18 U.S.C. § 2339B(d)(1)(C) (2006).  
19  See USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-177, § 122, 
120 Stat. 192, 224 (2006) (amending the Controlled Substance Import and Export Act, 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 951–71 (2000)).  Jurisdiction is satisfied simply if the offender subsequently comes or “is brought” to 
the United States.  Id.; see also Conference Report on H.R. 3199, USA Patriot Improvement and Reau-
thorization Act of 2005, 151 CONG. REC. H11515, H11538–39 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2005) (statement of 
Rep. Hyde) (“Our hardworking Drug Enforcement Administration will no longer be challenged to pro-
duce evidence of a nexus of these illicit drugs to the United States.”).  
The material support law already criminalizes any financial aid to terror groups.  The new provision, 
in effect, allows for an additional and greater sentence when the support comes through conduct that 
would violate U.S. drug law if there was an American nexus.  
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efforts have tried to do the same with human trafficking.20  Congress has au-
thorized universal jurisdiction for hijacking, hostage-taking, and torture, 
which have been designated universal jurisdiction offenses by multilateral 
conventions.21  These laws have only been used in a few cases, and perhaps 
never as the basis for a purely universal jurisdiction prosecution.22  Other 
statutes give universal scope to civil liability23 for certain violations of in-
ternational law24 and U.S. boycott regulations.25  
 
 * * * 
 
This Article focuses on limitations on universal jurisdiction inherent in 
the Define and Punish Clause.  It does not consider other constitutional ob-
jections to universal criminal legislation, nor does it deal with other poten-
tial justifications.  Assertions of universal jurisdiction, and extraterritorial 
jurisdiction more generally, have been challenged, with little success, for 
 
20  See Child Soldiers Accountability Act of 2008, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2442(c)(3) (West 2008); see also 
Trafficking in Persons Accountability Act of 2007, S. 1703, 110th Cong. (2007). 
21  Antihijacking Act of 1974, 49 U.S.C. § 46502(b) (2000) (implementing the Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft); Destruction of Aircraft Act, 18 U.S.C. § 32(b)(3) (2006); 
Hostage Taking Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1203(b)(1)(B) (2006) (extending jurisdiction solely on the basis of 
subsequent U.S. presence of suspect, pursuant to the International Convention Against the Taking of 
Hostages, G.A. Res. 34/146, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1456 (Dec. 17, 1979)); see 
18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2006) (criminalizing torture anywhere in the world); United States v. Rezaq, 
134 F.3d 1121, 1131–32 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (finding that Congress specifically intended to create universal 
jurisdiction over hijacking); see also Genocide Accountability Act of 2007, S. 888, 110th Cong. (2007).  
22  One might think United States v. Shi, 525 F.3d 709, 721 (9th Cir. 2008), which explicitly invokes 
universal jurisdiction over piracy, is an exception to U.S. shyness in universal jurisdiction matters.  Yet 
the case—involving the murder of a foreign national by a Chinese sailor on a Taiwanese-owned, Sey-
chelles-flagged fishing vessel in the middle of the Pacific Ocean—was not truly one of piracy, or uni-
versal jurisdiction.  Under international law, offenses committed by crewmembers aboard their own 
vessel do not amount to piracy.  While the court was mistaken in treating it as a piracy case, it did have 
subject matter jurisdiction by virtue of a treaty and implementing legislation.  See Eugene Kontorovich, 
International Decisions: United States v. Shi, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming Apr. 2009). 
23  Some argue that the Define and Punish Clause may not authorize anything but criminal measures, 
in which case the analysis here would not apply to the noncriminal statutes.  See, e.g., HERITAGE 
FOUND., supra note 6, at 127.  But see Stephens, supra note 11, at 483–519 (arguing that “Offenses” 
also includes civil wrongs). 
24  See Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006); Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. 
102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (providing liability for “any person” acting under authority from a “foreign 
nation”).  While the latter explicitly contemplates universal jurisdiction, the scope of universal jurisdic-
tion under the former remains unclear.  See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 761–63 (2004) 
(Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Kontorovich, supra note 3.   
25  Under the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, the President can impose civil sanctions on foreigners 
who invest in or provide certain goods to the eponymous countries.  See J. Brett Busby, Note, Jurisdic-
tion to Limit Third-Country Interaction with Sanctioned States: The Iran and Libya Sanctions and 
Helms-Burton Acts, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 621, 647 (1998) (“[T]he Iran and Libya Sanctions Act 
does not require the proof of any U.S.-related conduct whatsoever before its sanctions may be im-
posed.”).  To the extent such trade may be maritime, the Act might implicate the Define and Punish 
Clause.  
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violating due process rights.26  The argument is that the Fifth Amendment 
requires the defendant’s conduct to have some nexus with the United States,  
This presumes that Congress has the Article I authority to criminalize 
purely foreign conduct in the first place.  While this Article demonstrates 
the existence of a nexus limitation on extraterritorial prosecution, its source 
is not due process, but rather the Define and Punish power.  The exact 
source of a nexus requirement is important.  With Article I limitations, 
unlike the personal rights implicated by due process, the consent of the de-
fendant or foreign state is irrelevant.  Foreign nations cannot bestow addi-
tional legislative powers on Congress.  
The exception to this rule is legislation pursuant to treaties.  Main-
stream interpretations of the treaty power authorize Congress to implement 
treaties through domestic legislation that would not otherwise be within its 
enumerated powers.27  Thus, the Offenses power refers to customary rather 
than conventional international law because when a treaty is in the picture, 
it defines the relevant scope of Congress’s power.  Most universal jurisdic-
tion laws were passed to implement particular treaties.28  However, there is 
no obvious treaty basis for the MDLEA, the ATS, or the child soldier law.  
This Article does not explore treaty power or other possible constitutional 
bases for universal jurisdiction laws, which should be examined on a stat-
ute-by-statute basis.29 
 
 * * * 
 
Part I of this Article deals with some issues of interpretive method.  It 
explains that while for circumstantial reasons the Article relies heavily on 
evidence from the Founding generation, it does not require a commitment 
to originalism.  It also discusses whether constitutional provisions that refer 
to international law—such as Clause Ten—incorporate the law as it was in 
1789 or as it is today.  Parts II and III examine the origins and purposes of 
the Define and Punish Clause by looking to its emergence in the Articles of 
 
26  See, e.g., United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1107–10 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that provi-
sions of the MDLEA requiring courts to decide whether statutory jurisdictional requirements have been 
met do not violate the Due Process Clause or the right to a jury trial).  
27  See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920) (upholding migratory bird regulations that 
may not have been within Congress’s Commerce Clause power because it was passed to implement 
treaty obligations with Britain). 
28  See supra note 21.  However, these statutes arguably go further than the treaties on which they 
are based.  The conventions only purport to create “universal” jurisdictional rights over nationals of sig-
natory states.  While most nations have joined these treaties, the implementing statutes do not limit their 
application to the nationals of signatory states. 
29  Unlike the Torture Victim Protection Act, passed pursuant to Torture Convention, the ATS by its 
terms encompasses both customary and conventional international law, and thus it is hard to see it as 
“necessary and proper” to any particular treaty.  The companion piece to this Article discusses a range of 
alternate bases for the MDLEA, including treaty powers and the Foreign Commerce Clause, but ulti-
mately finds them inadequate.  See Kontorovich, supra note †. 
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Confederation, the reasons behind its adoption in Philadelphia, the strange 
redundancy in its terms, and how it should be understood given the back-
ground legal norms of the time.  Parts IV and V look at the two major epi-
sodes in which the constitutional question has been confronted.  Part IV 
examines the hostile judicial response to a law passed by the First Congress 
that, if read literally, would have made a wide variety of maritime crimes 
subject to universal jurisdiction.  Part V recounts how Congress, when it 
sought to establish slave trading as a universal jurisdiction offense, ulti-
mately concluded that it lacked the constitutional authority to do so.  Fi-
nally, the conclusion assembles the pieces of evidence to formulate a 
general statement of the jurisdictional limits under Clause Ten, taking into 
account the major expansion of universal jurisdiction in recent decades. 
I. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
A. Interpretive Theories 
This Article focuses heavily on the views of the Framers and their im-
mediate successors in the early Republic.  This should not be mistaken as a 
commitment to any brand of originalism.  All major interpretive approaches 
place great weight on the views of the Constitution’s authors, adopters, and 
early interpreters.30  Furthermore, the use of such evidence is unavoidable, 
as almost all discussion of Clause Ten’s scope took place in the Republic’s 
first thirty years.  
This Article’s only axiom is that Congress’s powers are finite and 
enumerated.31  Beyond that, the Article does not rely on any particular the-
ory of constitutional interpretation.  It promiscuously considers the back-
ground and drafting history of the clause, the meaning of the text given the 
legal vocabulary of the time, the understanding of the founding generation, 
the subsequent application of the clause by Congress and the courts in situa-
tions not necessarily contemplated by the Framers, and the more general 
purposes it was designed to serve.32  Recourse to particular theories of in-
terpretation is unnecessary when, as here, the evidence from a variety of 
sources points predominantly in one direction.  
 
30  See Kent, supra note 9, at 858–60 (describing consensus among interpretive methods on the im-
portance of the Constitution’s original meaning). 
31  See generally Bradley, supra note 6, at 334–35 (taking these principles as axiomatic).   
32  This Article disclaims a strong version of original intent.  It does not contend that the delegates at 
Philadelphia used the words “Piracies and Felonies” for the particular purpose of limiting universal ju-
risdiction.  Rather, the limitations are a consequence of the words they used, which had well-established 
public meanings.   
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B. Evolution in Common and International Law 
In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, customary interna-
tional law was widely regarded as part of American general law.  Indeed, 
the common law explicitly incorporated certain aspects of the law of na-
tions, like the definition and universal status of piracy.33  Thus, when it was 
relevant, judges would feel free to look at the law of nations even in the ab-
sence of a statute.  However, all agreed that Congress could trump the law 
of nations through legislation,34 and certainly the Constitution could limit its 
application.35  This remains the view today. 
At the same time, the Constitution explicitly uses terms of art from 
both the common law and the law of nations, partially incorporating them 
by reference.  Indeed, even if customary international law does not apply of 
its own force after the post-Erie abandonment of general common law, the 
Constitution’s use of common law and international law terms makes those 
bodies of law the standard for understanding the Constitution itself.36  In 
other words, customary international law is domestic law only when the 
Constitution makes it so.  By invoking terms of customary international law 
or the common law, the Constitution partially incorporates the associated 
bodies of law, but only insofar as they are relevant to understanding the 
terms in the Constitution.37  
 
33  See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714 (2004). 
34  Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (Marshall, C.J.) 
(“[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible 
construction remains.”). 
35  See Chislom v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 449 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting) (“The Conven-
tional Law of Nations . . . [cannot] otherwise apply [to the case] than as furnishing rules of interpreta-
tion, since unquestionably the people of the United States had a right to form what kind of union, and 
upon what terms they pleased . . . .  If upon a fair construction of the Constitution of the United States, 
the power contended for really exists, it undoubtedly may be exercised, though it be a power of the first 
impression.  If it does not exist . . . ten thousand examples of similar powers would not warrant its as-
sumption.”  (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted)). 
36  See Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 551 (2006); see 
also Sarah Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 12 (2006) (“In its strongest 
form, the Constitution textually commands consideration of international law through [Clause Ten] 
. . . .”). 
37  For common law, see Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004) (holding that the constitu-
tional right of the accused “to be confronted with the witnesses against him” refers to common law right 
of confrontation at the time of the Founding).  For international law, see Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 
1099, 1101 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360) (Jay, C.J.) (“Whenever doubts and questions arise relative to 
the validity, operation or construction of treaties . . . [these] must be settled according to the maxims and 
principles of the laws of nations applicable to the case.”); Ware v. Hylton, (C.C.D. Va. 1793) (Iredell, 
J.), in 7 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 264–68 (Maeva 
Marcus ed., 2003) (turning to the law of nations to determine construction and validity of U.S. treaty); 
and United States v. Coolidge, 25 F. Cas. 619, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 14,857) (Story, J.) (“The 
existence, therefore, of the common law is not only supposed by the [C]onstitution, but is appealed to 
for the construction and interpretation of its powers.”).  See also JAMES MADISON, Power of the Presi-
dent to Appoint Public Ministers & Consuls in the Recess of the Senate, in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES 
MADISON, COMPRISING HIS PUBLIC PAPERS AND HIS PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE 91 n.1 (Gaillard Hunt 
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An even broader view of the common law’s role in understanding the 
Constitution would be to take certain late eighteenth-century common law 
principles as providing a gloss or background without which the entire Con-
stitution could not be understood.  In this view, international law limits 
might be constitutional but not textual,38 much like sovereign immunity39 
and limitations on standing.40  
John Quincy Adams laid out the “background rules” approach to the 
relevance of international law to constitutional interpretation: 
The legislative powers of Congress are . . . limited to specific grants contained 
in the Constitution itself, all restricted on one side by the power of internal leg-
islation within the separate States, and on the other, by the laws of nations . . . .  
These are not subject to the legislative authority of any one nation, and they 
are, therefore, not included within the powers of Congress.41  
In the very next breath, Adams expressed the narrower explicit-
incorporation view, while providing an apt summary of this Article’s thesis: 
The powers of declaring war, of regulating commerce, of defining and punish-
ing piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses AGAINST 
THE LAW OF NATIONS, are among the special grants to Congress, but over 
that law itself, thus expressly recognised, and all-comprehensive as it is, Con-
gress has no alterative power.42 
Given that the Constitution refers to international law for a definition of its 
terms, it raises the question of whether the terms lock in the law of 1789 or 
whether they track the constant changes and evolutions in the body of law 
to which they refer.  The same question arises with the many constitutional 
terms referring to common law concepts.  The topic is a major one in its 
own right.  The conclusion of the Article briefly touches on this question, as 
possible answers have different implications for universal jurisdiction under 
Clause Ten today. 
For the purposes of this Article, in considering the opinions expressed 
by the Framers, the first Supreme Court Justices, and early Congresses, it is 
                                                                                                                           
ed., 1910) (“The case of diplomatic missions belongs to the Law of Nations, and the principles & usages 
on which that is founded are entitled to a certain influence in expounding the provisions of the Constitu-
tion which have relation to such missions.”). 
38  See Cleveland, supra note 36, at 33 (observing that the Supreme Court sometimes looks to 
“background” norms of jurisdiction under international law because of “the assumption that the constitu-
tional system implicitly received and distributed certain powers of government and rights of individuals 
that were recognized under international law,” and that this use of international law “involves a mixture 
of resort to international law as binding and persuasive authority”). 
39  See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999). 
40  Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 833 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (noting the “traditional com-
mon-law cause of action at the conceptual core of the case-or-controversy requirement”). 
41  JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, THE JUBILEE OF THE CONSTITUTION 71 (New York, Samuel Colman 
1839). 
42  Id. (last emphasis added). 
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crucial to identify the source of any obstacle they perceived to universal ju-
risdiction.  Much of their discussion mentioned international law, which 
could be relevant either by virtue of its own direct applicability or through 
its incorporation in the Constitution.  This Article is only concerned with 
the latter use of international law, because as a matter of domestic law, in-
ternational law by its own force cannot trump clear statutes. 
II. ORIGINS OF THE CLAUSE 
The Define and Punish Clause was among the least controversial in the 
Constitution.  It represented an incremental and obvious improvement on a 
similar provision in the Articles of Confederation.43  It received little “seri-
ous” discussion at the Philadelphia Convention44 and seems not to have 
been an issue at all during the ratification process.  Nonetheless, an exami-
nation of the clause’s origins, text, purposes, and the few statements about it 
by the Framers, when taken together, greatly illuminates the scope of the 
clause.  
Courts and commentators often mistakenly construe the Piracies and 
Felonies provision as granting a single power.45  However, the two words 
have different meanings and convey distinct competencies.  The authority 
over felonies covers a wider range of conduct but is narrower in its extrater-
ritorial scope than piracy.  Piracy has until recently been a unique crime—
the only one to which universal jurisdiction attached.  The Constitution 
mentions piracy separately from two broader terms that would be thought to 
encompass it—“felonies” and “offenses.”  Piracy’s unique status as a uni-
versal jurisdiction offense suggests that its separate enumeration in Clause 
Ten specifically allows Congress to exercise universal jurisdiction over that 
particular type of offense—but not over other high seas crimes or interna-
tional law offenses. 
 
43  ARTS. OF CONFED. art. IX, § 1, cl. 6 (only allowing for the “appointing of courts for the trial of 
piracies and felonies committed on the high seas,” and not for the definition or punishment of those 
crimes).  
44  3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1160 (Bos-
ton, Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833).   
45  See, e.g., United States v. Suerte, 291 F.3d 366, 374 (5th Cir. 2005) (suggesting that these “paral-
lel” provisions are interchangeable terms); United States v. Moreno-Morillo, 334 F.3d 819, 824–25 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (holding that drug smuggling in international waters is a “piracy or felony within the meaning 
of Article I, Section 8, Clause Ten” without specifying whether it is justified by the power over piracies 
or over felonies); United States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d 1052, 1056 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that 
the MDLEA is justified by Congress’s authority under the Piracies and Felonies provision without speci-
fying whether drug smuggling is piracy or a felony).  But see United States v. Shi, 525 F.3d 709, 721, 
724 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that the Supreme Court has “treat[ed] ‘Piracies,’ ‘Felonies on the high Seas,’ 
and ‘Offenses against the Laws of Nations’ as three separate” categories, and noting that the MDLEA is 
an exercise of the felonies power).  
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A. The Drafting 
1. The Articles of Confederation.—The phrase “piracies and felo-
nies” first appeared in the Articles of Confederation in a provision giving 
Congress exclusive power to “appoint[] courts for the trial of piracies and 
felonies committed on the high seas.”46  The reasons for including this in the 
Articles do not appear to have been discussed, probably because its utility 
was evident.47  
“Piracies and felonies” was a well-known legal formula for maritime 
crimes, used in the leading statutes and treatises.48  Coke’s massively influ-
ential work speaks of “piracies[] and felonies,”49 even though piracies were 
a subspecies of felony.  In a historical note typical of his erudite work, Coke 
explains that piracy was not originally a common law felony, but rather a 
crime cognizable only in admiralty, which was civil law.50  However, under 
Henry VIII, piracy was brought within the common law processes by stat-
ute and denominated a felony.51  By the late seventeenth century, felony had 
come to mean any very serious crime, especially those punishable by 
death.52  Thus, the popular or public meaning of felony by 1776 would have 
subsumed piracy.  
The Framers were aware of the historical difference between piracy 
and felony jurisdiction, and Madison went so far as to suggest that it was 
 
46  ARTS. OF CONFED. art. IX.  State constitutions lacked analogous provisions; such power fell 
within their general criminal jurisdiction.  Some royal charters had specified that the colonial authorities 
had power to take military action against pirates; piracy was sometimes understood as being closer to 
war than crime.  See, e.g., CHARTER OF CAROLINA art. XV (1663) (authorizing local authorities “to 
make war and pursue [pirates and robbers] . . . even without the limits of the said province . . . to van-
quish and take them, and, being taken to put them to death by the law of war, or to save them, at their 
pleasure”). 
47  Some small differences can be found between the final Articles and the first draft, prepared by a 
committee led by John Dickinson in June 1776, just a month after Congress called for a constitution to 
be written.  The first version presented to Congress in the summer of 1776, authorized “[a]ppointing 
Courts for the Trial of all Crimes, Frauds & Piracies committed on the High Seas . . . .”  5 JOURNALS OF 
THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1778, at 550 (Worthington Chauncy Ford ed., 1906).  The “frauds” 
on the high seas are a mystery; it is not clear what the term meant or why it was dropped. 
48  See CROSSKEY, supra note 8, at 445–46. 
49  SIR EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: 
CONCERNING HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN, AND CRIMINAL CAUSES 111 (Lon-
don, W. Clarke and Sons 1817). 
50  Id. at 112 (“[P]iracy, or robbery on the high sea was no felony, whereof the common law took 
any knowledge, . . . but was only punishable by the civill law . . . .”). 
51  See Report to Congress on Draft Ordinance for the Trial of Piracies and Felonies (Sept. 29, 
1785) (statement of John Jay) [hereinafter Jay, Report], in 29 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL 
CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 797 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1933); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *71 (writing that statues have made piracy a “felony” in English law). 
52  See BLACKSTONE, supra note 51, at *94 (defining felony as crime with significant and often capi-
tal punishment). 
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the reason that the term “felony” itself would not suffice.53  But it is implau-
sible that piracy was mentioned separately simply to make clear that Amer-
ica’s common law courts could reach piracy.  In 1776, piracy had been a 
common law felony for 250 years.  It seems preposterous that the drafters 
would think that merely saying felonies without mentioning piracies would 
repeal the effect of the ancient statute of Henry VIII, making piracy a case 
that a jury could not try.54   
Indeed, the situation described by Coke was irrelevant in the colonies, 
where neither high seas felonies nor robberies were tried by common law 
courts.  A 1700 statute put most maritime crimes near the colonies within 
the purview of the admiral, as it had originally been before the statute of 
Henry VIII.55  The result was that in 1776 both piracy and maritime felonies 
were tried before special admiralty courts in the colonies, while in England 
both were tried in common law courts.56  Madison’s discussion of the an-
cient history of piracy as being in a different category from felony simply 
shows that he was very familiar with Coke, but not that this history was 
relevant to the drafting of the Articles.  Rather, “piracies and felonies” was 
an established legal formula.  While the difference between the two in terms 
of forum had long been eliminated, differences in jurisdictional scope re-
mained, of which the drafters were also certainly aware. 
Under the Articles, Congress lacked the power to define the substance 
of these offenses.57  Thus the courts, manned by state court judges drafted 
into a concurrent federal service,58 would draw the definition of the crimes 
from the common law.59  Nor did Congress have any power over offenses 
against the law of nations, which remained entirely within the jurisdiction 
of the states.  Soon after the Articles had been drafted, many concluded that 
it had been a mistake not to also grant a power to define these “piracies and 
 
53  Madison noted the difference during the Philadelphia Convention.  JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF 
DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 473–74 (Adrienne Koch ed., 1966) (noting that 
“felony at common law” was a vague term, but not so with piracy, and referring to historic statutes on 
the subject); see also Jay, Report, supra note 51, at 798. 
54  Indeed, the original practice in England appears to have been to try pirates and other sea criminals 
in ordinary courts; a statute of Edward III in 1361 moved piracies to special royal tribunals, where they 
would be prosecuted until Henry VIII returned them to law nearly two hundred years later.  CROSSKEY, 
supra note 8, at 446–47. 
55  See id. at 445–446, 450. 
56  Id. at 452–53. 
57  STORY, supra note 44, § 1153. 
58  Ordinance for Establishing Courts for the Trial of Piracies and Felonies Committed on the High 
Seas, in 19 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 354, 354–55 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 
1912); see also James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Constitutionality 
of Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 191, 207–08 (2007) (distinguishing Con-
gress’s power under the Articles of Confederation to deputize state courts to hear high seas crimes from 
its power to establish a uniquely federal court of appeals for captures cases). 
59  See Jay, Report, supra note 51, at 797–98. 
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felonies.”60  As a result of the omission, the punishment of offenses on U.S.-
flagged vessels would depend on the state where the crime was adjudi-
cated.61  Two identical acts on the same ship, involving the same people, 
could have different legal consequences if prosecuted in different states.   
2. Philadelphia.—At the Constitutional Convention, Clause Ten 
generated no excitement.  The drafters took the “Piracies and Felonies” 
phrase from the Articles and expanded it by giving Congress legislative and 
not just judicial power in these areas, as well as over “Offenses against the 
Law of Nations.”  Presumably, “Piracies and Felonies” referred to the same 
thing that it had in the Articles.62  Yet no one has ever suggested that Con-
gress under the Articles could establish courts for the “trial . . . of felonies 
on the high seas” aboard foreign vessels with no U.S. connection.   
The need to strengthen Congress’s criminal powers over these crimes 
was assumed by the delegates at the convention.  There is no recorded dis-
cussion of the clause until it appeared in the Committee of Detail’s report.  
That version varied little from the text that would ultimately be adopted.63  
The brief debate that followed focused not on the types of crimes Congress 
could deal with, but rather on what it meant for Congress to “define” and 
“punish” them.64  The original draft allowed Congress to “declare the law of 




60  After the final draft of the Articles of Confederation had been submitted to the states, a proposal 
was made to modify Article IX by allowing the federal courts to “declar[e] what acts committed on the 
high seas shall be deemed piracies and felonies.”  See STORY, supra note 44, § 1153 n.4.  The motion 
failed 9-2, probably because Congress did not want to reopen the Articles for revision once they had 
been submitted to the states, as many states had submitted a long list of relatively minor drafting revi-
sions.  Id.; 11 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 651–58 (Worthington 
Chauncey Ford ed., 1908). 
61  See Jay, Report, supra note 51, at 797. 
62  See United States v. Mackenzie, 30 F. Cas. 1160, 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1843) (No. 18,313) (observing 
that when the Convention “transferred to the new constitution the language of the confederation in rela-
tion to the government of the land and naval forces, and the spirit of the provision in respect to piracies 
and felonies, it is natural to suppose that these provisions were understood in the same sense, and were 
designed to convey the same power, as that affixed to them in the usages and practices under the preced-
ing government”). 
63  The Committee on Detail’s draft provided for the power “To declare the law and punishment of 
piracies and felonies committed on the high seas . . . .”  MADISON, supra note 53, at 389.  This of course 
was what South Carolina had thought the Articles should have said.  Interestingly, the committee’s draft 
sandwiched the punishment of counterfeiting between “Piracies and Felonies” and “Offenses against the 
Law of Nations,” suggesting they saw themselves as enumerating Congress’s overall criminal powers 
rather than merely elaborating those that might bear most on foreign relations or extraterritorial offenses. 
64  Id. at 472–74. 
103:149  (2009) The “Define and Punish” Clause and Universal Jurisdiction 
 163 
nate” as a substitution,65 the delegates settled on Madison and Randolph’s 
proposed “define” instead of “declare the law.”66 
While this discussion seems no less “obscure” today than it did to Jus-
tice Story two hundred years ago,67 the general concern seems to have been 
whether the original language would limit Congress too tightly to some pre-
existing description of the crimes, or whether the amendment gave Con-
gress too much leeway to depart from existing meanings.  Some thought it 
took too much from the states to give Congress power to define offenses 
that already existed in state law.68  Similarly, others felt it would be “arro-
gance” to purport to define offenses against the law of nations, which all 
countries played a joint role in developing.69  The answer to both concerns 
was that the specifications of crimes in both the common law and the law of 
nations were too uncertain and shifting to provide an administrable and uni-
form rule.70  The “define” power was necessary to fix the version of the of-
fense, and in Madison’s view, to clarify that international law did not create 
individual criminal liability of its own force.71 
Nobody said a word about the meaning of “Piracies,” “Felonies,” or 
“Offenses.”  Nor was there any discussion of whether there was any juris-
dictional limit on Congress’s power to define, though it was agreed that 
Congress could create substantively new crimes.72  
B. The Double Redundancy 
The resulting provision, Clause Ten, contains a striking double redun-
dancy.  “Piracies” refers to a particular crime.  “Felonies,” in contrast, de-
scribes a broad category, as does “Offenses against the Law of Nations.”73  
Piracy is a subspecies of felony, and one that necessarily occurs on the high 
seas.  Moreover, piracy was an offense against the law of nations74—indeed, 
 
65  2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 316 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).  This 
proposal was made by Gouverneur Morris because “define . . . being as he conceived, limited to the pre-
existing meaning.”  Id.  He was reassured by “others” that the draft’s term was “applicable to the creat-
ing of offences also, and therefore suited the case both of felonies & of piracies.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
66  MADISON, supra note 53, at 472–74. 
67  STORY, supra note 44, § 1162. 
68  THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 65, at 315 (“Mr. Mason . . . 
doubted . . . the propriety of taking the power in all these cases wholly from the States.”). 
69  Id. at 615. 
70  Id. at 316. 
71  Id. (“[N]o foreign law should be a standard farther than is expressly adopted . . . .  The proper 
remedy for all these difficulties was to vest the power proposed by the term ‘define’ in the Natl. legisla-
ture.”). 
72  See supra note 65. 
73  WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 107–08 (2d ed., Phila-
delphia, Philip H. Nicklin, 1829) (“Felony . . . when committed on the high seas, amounts to piracy.”).  
74  See BLACKSTONE, supra note 51, at *68; THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 280–81 (James Madison) 
(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (observing that piracy is a crime against the law of nations). 
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the “highest Violation,” according to John Jay.75  The first redundancy be-
tween piracy and felonies already existed in the predecessor clause in the 
Articles.  But the phrase does not explain why—if it was redundant—it was 
preserved in the Constitution, which the drafters recognized as a different 
kind of document, one in which every word would be closely construed.  
Indeed, in several instances the drafters condensed and clarified phrases 
borrowed from British law that were prone to redundant expressions.76  In 
the discussion at Philadelphia, the words “define” and “punish” were parsed 
quite carefully.  Yet no one said that the new grant of power over “Of-
fenses” made “Piracies” redundant.  This suggests that “Piracies” indicates 
something that “Offenses” and “Felonies” do not. 
Constitutional construction disfavors readings of one provision that 
that render another superfluous.77  In the Supreme Court’s first major piracy 
case, Justice Story insisted that potentially overlapping words in Clause Ten 
take separate meanings.78  A double-redundancy requires investigating 
whether anything distinguishes piracy both from other felonies and from 
other offenses against the law of nations—whether there might be a reason 
for the Constitution treating them differently.79  If piracy has a salient, well-
known feature distinguishing it from other felonies, it would suggest that 
the separate enumeration of piracy seeks to emphasize and pick up on that 
feature. 
Contemporaneous evidence suggests the Framers understood “Piracies 
and Felonies” as referring to two distinct powers, with different features 
and scope.  In 1785, Congress asked John Jay, then head of the Foreign Of-
fice, to draft a statute establishing courts for piracy and high-seas felonies 
pursuant to Article IX of the Articles of Confederation.  In his response, Jay 
complained that the Articles did not authorize Congress to “declare” the 
 
75  See Jay, Report, supra note 51, at 797. 
76  See CROSSKEY, supra note 8, at 456 (explaining that the term “high seas” was a contraction of a 
much longer phrase used in British statutes to refer to admiralty jurisdiction). 
77  See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.) (rejecting an 
interpretation that would make part of the Constitution “mere surplusage,” because “[i]t cannot be pre-
sumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect”).  Redundancy is disfavored, 
but not out of the question.  For example, Marshall’s interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause 
in McCulloch v. Maryland makes the Counterfeiting Clause redundant to the power to coin money.  
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 416–17 (1819).  However, the presumption is particularly strong within a 
clause.  See Gary Lawson, Discretion as Delegation: The “Proper” Understanding of the Nondelega-
tion Doctrine, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235, 252 (2005) (arguing that the anti-redundancy presumption is 
weak for provisions in different articles of the Constitution).  
78  United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 158 (1820) (“The power given to Congress is not 
merely ‘to define and punish piracies;’ if it were, the words ‘to define,’ would seem almost superfluous, 
since the power to punish piracies would be held to include the power of ascertaining and fixing the 
definition of the crime.”). 
79  Cf. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 174 (holding that construing words as redundant “is inadmissi-
ble, unless the words require it” (emphasis added)).  
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definition or punishment of either piracies or felonies.80  However, he con-
tinued, because piracy is in a sense an act of war against the nation, it would 
be acceptable for the United States to define and punish it; just as the war 
power resided on the federal level, so too the power to deal with pirates.81  
Jay went on to observe that cases of felonies are “distinguished from Pi-
racy,” and thus Congress was limited to the definitions found in state laws 
with respect to them.82  Similarly, at the Federal Convention, delegates 
spoke of “piracies” and “felonies” as different things.83  Finally, in United 
States v. Smith, the seminal case on piracy, the Court addressed “the author-
ity delegated to Congress upon the subject of piracies” as distinct from its 
authority over felonies on the high seas.84  Justice Story also observed in 
dicta that the powers involve different legal and policy considerations.85 
C. Uniqueness of Piracy 
One major difference existed between piracy and the other powers 
listed in Clause Ten, lending strength to the view that the separate mention 
of “Piracies” set it apart as a distinct power.86  Piracy was jurisdictionally 
unique.  For as long as sovereignty-based jurisdictional principles have ex-
isted (that is, at least since the early seventeenth century) piracy was the 
only universal jurisdiction offense.87  The pirate was known in law as hostis 
 
80  See Jay, Report, supra note 51, at 797. 
81  Id. at 797–78; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10–11 (giving Congress power to punish piracy 
and declare war). 
82  Jay, Report, supra note 51, at 798. 
83  See MADISON, supra note 53, at 473–74; THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, supra note 74, at 281 (“The 
definition of piracies might perhaps without inconveniency, be left to the law of nations . . . .  A defini-
tion of felonies . . . is evidently requisite.”). 
84  18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 158–59 (1820). 
85  Id.  Similarly, in his treatise on constitutional law, piracies, felonies, and offenses are treated as 
distinct aspects of the Clause Ten power.  STORY, supra note 44, § 1155. 
86  Constitutional construction often involves learning about a term’s meaning from surrounding 
terms.  For example, the Impeachment Clause, like the Define and Punish Clause, lists several classes of 
offenses: “Treason, Bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.”  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.  Many 
scholars argue that the “or” means that the broader category should be understood as expanding on the 
characteristics of the two particular illustrations.  See Thomas Lee, The Clinton Impeachment and the 
Constitution: Introduction to the Federalist Society Panel, 1999 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1079, 1086–87 (observ-
ing that debates about the text of the clause invoked “the ejusdem generis canon of construction, which 
dictates that terms in a list should be construed to be ‘of the same kind’ as the other terms whose com-
pany they keep”).   
87  See Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 162 (noting the “general practice of all nations in punishing all 
persons, whether natives or foreigners, who have committed this offence against any persons whatso-
ever”); Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 159–60 (1795) (“All piracies and trespasses committed 
against the general law of nations, are enquirable, and may be proceeded against, in any nation . . . .”); 
United States v. Robins, 27 F. Cas. 825, 862 (D.S.C. 1799) (No. 16,175) (“[P]iracy under the law of na-
tions which alone is punishable by all nations . . . .” (quoting a speech of John Marshall to Congress) 
(emphasis added)); see also United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 104 (2d Cir. 2003) (“The class of 
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humani generis; the offense was almost synonymous with universal juris-
diction.88  The unique jurisdictional status of pirates was not an obscure 
piece of legal trivia.89  Piracy was a significant problem, one with which the 
public in a maritime nation was generally concerned.  Moreover, a legalized 
form of piracy—privateering—was almost a national pastime during the 
Revolutionary War.  The laws of prize were as familiar to the lawyers of the 
day as the rules of baseball are today.90  The line between piracy and priva-
teering was perhaps the most important one to know.  Though jurisdiction-
ally broad, the crime of piracy was substantively narrow.  It consisted 
simply of robbery on the high seas.91  Other crimes that occurred on the 
high seas were dealt with under traditional jurisdictional principles.92 
Thus piracy had a uniform technical meaning as an international law 
offense.  At the same time, nations could and did attach the term “piracy” to 
a variety of different maritime crimes.93  This was done either to draw on 
the strong condemnatory connotations attached to the term because it had a 
popular meaning of serious or capital offense on the high seas, or simply 
out of legislative imprecision and sloppiness.  Finally, because piracy in the 
classic sense was universally punishable by death, declaring something a pi-
racy meant deeming it severe enough to merit the death penalty.94  So in ad-
dition to piracy under the law of nations, different nations made diverse 
offenses “municipal” or “statutory piracies.”  Nothing limited what a nation 
could dub piracy, but such statutory piracy could only be punished within 
the particular state’s municipal jurisdiction.  Universal jurisdiction did not 
attach to a crime merely by calling it piracy. 
                                                                                                                           
crimes subject to universal jurisdiction traditionally included only piracy.”).  See generally Kontorovich, 
supra note 12, at 190–91 (discussing piracy’s status as the prototypical universal jurisdiction crime). 
88  See Kontorovich, supra note 12, at 190. 
89  See BLACKSTONE, supra note 51, at *71 (observing that “every community” has a right to punish 
pirates). 
90  DONALD A. PETRIE, THE PRIZE GAME: LAWFUL LOOTING ON THE HIGH SEAS IN THE DAYS OF 
THE FIGHTING SAIL 37 (1999); see U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 11 (giving Congress the power to “grant 
Letters of Marque and Reprisal,” as privateers’ licenses were known). 
91  Smith, 18 U.S. at 161–62 (“[P]iracy is only a sea term for robbery, piracy being a robbery com-
mitted within the jurisdiction of the admirality.”); Talbot, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 160 (“What is called rob-
bery on the land, is piracy if committed at sea.”); see also BLACKSTONE, supra note 51, at *72 (defining 
piracy as “robbery and depredation upon the high seas”). 
92  See Kontorovich, supra note 3, at 153–55 (discussing reasons that universal jurisdiction was con-
fined to high seas robbery).  
93  10 ANNALS OF CONG. 600 (1800) (statement of John Marshall) (“A statute may make any offense 
piracy, committed within the jurisdiction of the nation passing the statute . . . .”). 
94  HENRY WHEATON, ENQUIRY INTO VALIDITY OF THE BRITISH CLAIM TO A RIGHT OF VISITATION 
AND SEARCH OF AMERICAN VESSELS SUSPECTED TO BE ENGAGED IN THE AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE 16 
(Philadelphia, Lea & Blanchard 1842) (“All that is meant is, that the offence is visited with the pains and 
penalties of piracy.”). 
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This jurisdictional distinction was well understood,95 yet the careless 
use of “piracy” could and did lead to confusion.96  As Wheaton, the Ameri-
can diplomat, reporter of Supreme Court decisions, and author of the lead-
ing early nineteenth-century American treatise on international law, put it: 
“There are certain acts which are considered piracy by the internal laws of a 
State, to which the law of nations does not attach the same signification. . . . 
[These laws] can only be applied . . . with reference to its own subjects, and 
in places within its own jurisdiction.”97  Thus, “piracy created by municipal 
statute can only be punished by that State within whose territorial jurisdic-
tion” or “on board of whose vessels, the offence thus created was commit-
ted.”98  This clarification demonstrates that the constitutional distinction 
between felonies and piracies should properly track the distinction between 
municipal and international, or true, piracy. 
D. Summary 
When read against the legal backdrop of the Framing, the enumeration 
of “Piracies” implies that Congress can punish it the way nations generally 
could—without regard to the nationality of the vessel or offender.99  How-
ever, if “Felonies” can be punished without regard to a U.S. nexus, then all 
distinction between it and “Piracies” falls away.  The Constitution may as 
well have just said “crimes.”  By separating the powers in Clause Ten, the 
Constitution keeps their consequences separate.  The unique universal ju-
risdiction powers that all nations exercised over piracy could not be im-
puted to other crimes that lacked universal jurisdiction status in 
international law, even if they resembled piracy in that they occurred on the 
high seas or violated international law.  
Furthermore, piracy is mentioned separately from “Offenses against 
the Law of Nations.”  After all, piracy gets its universal jurisdiction status 
from international law.  One might think that the power to define and pun-
ish international law crimes would naturally entail the power to ascribe uni-
versal jurisdiction to piracy.  The retention of “Piracies,” which was a 
holdover from the Articles of Confederation, even after “Offenses” had 
been added at the Philadelphia Convention, could suggest that there might 
have been some doubt as to whether the “Offenses” provision itself would 
authorize universal jurisdiction over piracy.  Even with regards to piracy, 
 
95  Id. (“[T]he piracy thus created by municipal statute must not be confounded with piracy under the 
law of nations.”); see also 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 600 (1800) (distinguishing “piracy under the law of 
nations,” or “general piracy,” from “piracy by statute”).  
96  See 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 600 (1800) (cautioning that “confounding” international and municipal 
piracy leads to “indistinct” ideas about jurisdiction). 
97  HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, § 124, at 164 (George Grafton Wilson 
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1936) (1866). 
98  Id. 
99  United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 162 (1820) (holding that piracy in the Constitu-
tion referred to the well-known and uniform meaning of the term in international law). 
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however, such expansive jurisdiction may have seemed an unnecessary 
danger.  The young Republic tried to avoid judicial proceedings that could 
endanger its neutrality.100  Opening U.S. courts to disputes solely about for-
eigners on matters likely to concern affairs of foreign states could have 
forced the nation into the thicket of European politics.  Similarly, while to-
day many more offenses fall under universal jurisdiction under international 
law, very few nations’ constitutions allow their courts to actually exercise 
universal jurisdiction over them.101  
Though the text, together with the drafting history, raises a strong ar-
gument about the “Felonies” and “Offenses” powers being nonuniversal, 
this evidence is too thin to be conclusive.  But the very paucity of debate 
over the clause suggests something about how it was understood, especially 
given the background assumptions about territorial jurisdiction, the pur-
poses of punishment, and the nature of the new union.  Given many of the 
Framers’ concerns about congressional aggrandizement, it would be odd if 
Congress were given authority to legislate universally without an express 
statement, or without someone noticing the implication.  The debate at the 
convention focused on whether it would be impudent to define piracies and 
offenses against the law of nations, since these are determined by state prac-
tice in general.  It would be incongruous for people to voice this concern 
but then say nothing about allowing Congress to actually legislate felonies 
for the rest of the world.  Moreover, one would expect that the Anti-
Federalist propagandists, who were not shy about exaggerating the poten-
tially imperial powers of the new government, would have raised this issue 
during the ratification process. 
III. POLICY OF THE CLAUSE 
A. Purposes 
By granting Congress the Define and Punish power, the Framers 
sought to provide a uniform standard of conduct on federal vessels and to 
ensure that the national government could deal with crimes that could em-
broil the country in disputes with foreign powers.  The uniformity goal 
seems to have dominated at the Philadelphia Convention.  Unlike piracy, 
 
100  See, e.g., Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9895) (rejecting jurisdiction 
over libel suit brought by British owners of vessel captured by French armed schooner).  See generally 
David Sloss, Judicial Foreign Policy: Lessons From the 1790s, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. (forthcoming 
2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1144060 (discussing litigation of 
British and French captures in U.S. admiralty courts, and the desire of the government to keep such 
cases out).  
101  See LUC REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL PERSPECTIVES 
221 (2003).  
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which had a single global meaning and punishment,102 felonies could vary 
from state to state.  Without a federal power to define the elements and pun-
ishment of crimes committed on the high seas, sailors on U.S. vessels could 
be subject to multiple criminal codes.103  The lack of an identifiable, uni-
form body of criminal law to apply to all on board U.S. vessels was seen as 
the principal defect of the predecessor clause in the Articles.104  The high 
seas are outside of state authority, and ships sailing there were outposts of 
U.S. sovereignty, not the sovereignty of a particular state. 
Second, the nation as a whole had an interest in the conduct of U.S.-
flagged vessels and nationals on the high seas, where they would most often 
have foreign contacts and thus foreign disputes, but where foreign justice 
might not reach them.  The entire nation, and not a state, would have to an-
swer for the conduct of U.S. nationals on the high seas or conduct in viola-
tion of international law.105  As a result, it was argued that Congress should 
possess the power to “define and punish all such offences, which may inter-
rupt our intercourse and harmony with” foreign states.106  This was in keep-
 
102  See ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 131 (R.L. Meek et al. eds., 1978) (observing 
that piracy is generally punished by death). 
103  MADISON, supra note 53, at 474 (“If the laws of the States were to prevail on this subject, the 
citizens of different States would be subject to different punishments for the same offence at sea.”); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 42, supra note 74, at 281 (“The meaning of the term [felony], as defined in the codes of 
the several States, would be as impracticable as [it] would be a dishonorable and illegitimate guide.  It is 
not precisely the same in any two of the States; and varies in each with every revision of its criminal 
laws.  For the sake of certainty and uniformity therefore, the power of defining felonies . . . was in every 
respect necessary and proper.”). 
104  See Jay, Report, supra note 51, at 797 (complaining that the “wise end” of uniformity “cannot be 
accomplished . . . in virtue of that Article in the Confederation”). 
105  See THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 535–36 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) 
(“[T]the peace of the WHOLE ought not to be left at the disposal of a PART.  The Union will undoubtedly 
be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its members.  And the responsibility for an injury 
ought ever to be accompanied with the faculty of preventing it.”); James Iredell, Charge to the Grand 
Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of New Jersey (Apr. 2, 1793), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800: THE JUSTICES ON CIRCUIT, 
1790–1794, at 348, 355 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1988) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
SUPREME COURT] (observing that the Constitution gives the Define and Punish power to Congress be-
cause “otherwise they might be [held] accountable for breaches of the Law of Nations committed with-
out their sanction”).  Justice Iredell described this power as the flip side of Congress’s war-making 
authority: because it would have to decide whether to enter a conflict, it should be given the necessary 
powers to avoid one.  See id. 
106  STORY, supra note 44, § 1160; see also 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S 
COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA app. D, at 268–69 
(Philadelphia, William Young Birch, and Abraham Small 1803) (suggesting that Congress, rather than 
the states, was given power over offenses against international law because of their close link with the 
war power and foreign relations). 
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ing with British and Colonial legislation, which regulated crimes on the 
high seas solely to protect the Crown’s sovereign interests.107  
This understanding of the provision’s twin purposes is instructive on 
several counts.  For one, it makes clear that Clause Ten was about rearrang-
ing power between the new federal government and the states, safely en-
trusting to the national government those powers previously held by the 
states.108  The purpose was an internal division of power rather than an out-
ward projection of the jurisdiction.109  John Marshall, shortly after the adop-
tion of the Constitution, argued that unless the states could previously 
punish entirely foreign conduct on the high seas, which no one has ever 
suggested, then they could not transfer this power to Congress. 
[T]hat clause in the Constitution, which enables Congress to define and punish 
piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, . . . can never be construed to 
make to the government a grant of power, which the people making it do not 
themselves possess. . . . [T]he people of the United States have no jurisdiction 
over offences committed on board a foreign ship against a foreign nation.  Of 
consequence, in framing a government for themselves, they cannot have 
passed this jurisdiction to that government.110 
Providing uniform criminal maritime law to “the citizens of different 
states” would make sense only if the Felonies provision applies only to U.S. 
citizens as well.111  From the perspective of seamen, a switch from multiple 
state definitions to a single federal one creates uniformity.112  But if ex-
 
107  See, e.g., An Act Against Piracy and Robbing upon the Sea, passed by Massachusetts Bay As-
sembly 172–73 (Boston, May 27, 1696), microformed on Early American Imprints, First Series No. 478 
(Evans Digital Collection). 
108  See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS, 1801–1829, at 
7 n.24 (2001). 
109  Indeed, the States were thought to have retained concurrent jurisdiction over piracy in areas such 
as the Chesapeake Bay.  See id.; see also 5 TUCKER, supra note 106, ed.’s app. A, at 5. 
110  10 ANNALS OF CONG. 607 (1800).  This view, if accepted in its entirety, could have major rami-
fications.  It could mean that Congress never has power to violate international law, because the states 
could not have delegated what they did not possess under the law of nations.  This would make interna-
tional law, or more precisely international law in 1789, an overarching limit on all governmental action. 
Marshall would not take his argument this far; he certainly thought Congress could act contrary to 
customary international law.  See Alexander Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 
(1804).  As a politician, Marshall may have felt freer to speak more loosely and broadly than he would 
when later deciding cases as a Justice.  Of course, this could suggest his entire discussion of Clause Ten 
in the Robbins affair is problematic.  Yet obviously much of it is sincere, as it was echoed later in 
Palmer.  United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 627–30 (1818).  A narrower understanding of 
his statement in the Robbins matter would regard his statements as an attempt to reconstruct the intent 
behind the Define and Punish Clause.  The clause, unlike most of the Constitution, specifically refers to 
international law as a standard.  Thus, Marshall may simply have meant that with no evidence to the 
contrary, the clause cannot be understood as expanding the powers of the United States beyond what 
was allowable by international law—this would be his Charming Betsy canon of statutory interpretation 
applied to the text of the Constitution itself. 
111  RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 65, at 316. 
112  See id. 
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tended to foreigners on foreign vessels, the clause brings “neither uniform-
ity nor stability in the law” to defendants;113 they would be subject to the 
laws of a nation with which they had no connection, in addition to the laws 
of their home or flag state.  
The foreign-relations purpose behind the clause arises only because 
“the welfare of the Union is essentially connected with the conduct of our 
citizens in regard to foreign nations.”114  Presumably, foreign countries 
would only take umbrage at the United States for crimes on the high seas or 
against international law when those crimes involved people or instrumen-
talities somehow connected to the United States.  Thus, this reason contem-
plates the Define and Punish power reaching only cases with a solid 
American nexus—the involvement of American nationals or vessels. 
Neither purpose of the Felonies provision—the need for uniform laws 
or the need to avoid conflict with foreign nations—suggests that the grant 
of that power would be thought to extend to foreigners on foreign vessels.  
In explaining the need for the clause, James Iredell, a major participant in 
the ratification process in the North Carolina legislature and later one of the 
first Justices on the Supreme Court, described the matters in Clause Ten as 
“immediately affecting the security, the honor or the interest of the United 
States at large . . . .”115  Thus, he argued, they should be entrusted to the 
“general Legislature of the Union.”116  His use of “immediately” suggests a 
direct nexus with the offense, rather than some general or remote “interest.” 
An alternate account leading to the same conclusion was provided by 
St. George Tucker, one of the most influential jurists of the early Republic.  
He saw the Piracies and Felonies power as a necessary corollary of the For-
eign Commerce Clause.117  Yet if Congress can regulate activity on the high 
seas without any U.S. nexus, such authority would swallow up the Foreign 
Commerce Clause, which limits Congress to regulating commerce “with” 
foreign nations.118  Such a sweeping reading of the Felonies power cannot 
be accepted without support from some evidence from the Framers. 
B. Background Assumptions 
The lack of discussion of the clause’s jurisdictional scope must be un-
derstood against the legal background of the time.  On the domestic side, 
 
113  MADISON, supra note 53, at 474. 
114  STORY, supra note 44, § 1160 (emphasis added). 
115  James Iredell, Answers to Mr. Mason’s Objections to the New Constitution, 1788, as reprinted in 
1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 449, 452 (1971) (emphasis 
added). 
116  Id. 
117  Id. 
118  TUCKER, supra note 106, app. D, at 268–69 (explaining that the Constitution grants Congress the 
Define and Punish powers because any activity on the high seas implicates foreign commerce, which 
“must necessarily be transacted by communication on the high seas”).  
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Congress was widely seen as a body with limited and defined powers, with 
particularly narrow criminal jurisdiction.119  The “high seas” has always 
been the indispensable conduit of a vast range of commercial and military 
activity.  If the Felonies power had no jurisdictional limit besides the locus, 
it would, with a single word, turn Congress from a body of limited powers 
into a world legislature.  
Moreover, jurisdiction was still formalistic and heavily territorial.  This 
followed the principle that a nation’s jurisdiction is an outgrowth of its sov-
ereignty and that its sovereignty is territorial.  Thus, no nation could have 
jurisdiction outside its sovereign domain except with the consent of another 
nation.  Chief Justice Marshall powerfully stated the territorial view of sov-
ereignty and jurisdiction in The Schooner Exchange.120  He noted in dicta 
that jurisdiction over foreigners extended only to their acts committed 
within the United States.  Such jurisdiction was required because it would 
be “obviously inconvenient and dangerous to society” to immunize foreign-
ers.121  There was little difference between jurisdictional overreaching and 
the invasion of another country’s foreign prerogatives.122  Because of this, it 
was widely thought that the inherent attributes of nationhood would disable 
a country from exercising jurisdiction on a universal basis.123  
Certain eighteenth-century political and legal theorists heavily influ-
enced the views of the Founding generation.  The impact of writers like 
Emmerich de Vattel cannot be underestimated.124  An appreciation of some 
 
119  See id. at 269 (observing that Congress is not entrusted with “general” power over crimes, but 
rather over “but a few offences [which] are selected from the great mass of crimes with which society 
may be infested”). 
120  The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136–37 (1812) (“The jurisdic-
tion of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute.  It is susceptible of no 
limitation not imposed by itself.  Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, 
would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that 
sovereignty to the same extent in that power which could impose such restriction.”). 
121  Id. at 144. 
122  See, e.g., Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1103 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360) (Jay, J.) (“It is to 
be remembered, that every nation is, and ought to be, perfectly and absolutely sovereign within its own 
dominions, to the entire exclusion of all foreign power, interference and jurisdiction . . . .”  (emphasis 
added)); see also 5 TUCKER, supra note 106, ed.’s app. A, at 5 (“The cognizance of all crimes and mis-
demeanours committed within the body of any state . . . belongs exclusively to the jurisdiction of that 
state. . . .  And in like manner the cognizance of all crimes and misdemeanours committed on the high 
seas (where all nations have a common jurisdiction) by citizens of the same state against each other; or, 
by common pirates, or robbers, against the citizens of any state, belongs to that particular state to whose 
citizens the injury is offered.”). 
123  1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 26 (New York, O. Halsted 1826) (“The 
subjects of all nations meet [on the ocean], in time of peace, on a footing of entire equality and inde-
pendence.  No nation has any right or jurisdiction at sea, except it be over the persons of its own sub-
jects, in its own vessels . . . .”). 
124  See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 463 n.12 (1978) (noting that Vat-
tel was the most cited authority on international law during the first fifty years of the Republic, and rely-
ing on his scholarship to determine the meaning of the terms “treaty” and “compact” as used in the 
Constitution).  Students of Vattel included Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and Alexander Hamilton; 
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of their views on extraterritorial jurisdiction helps demonstrate the general 
presumptions in place at the time.  The authors most influential among the 
Framers understood society as a compact among individuals, who previ-
ously enjoyed an anarchic autonomy.  Governments acquired from their 
subjects the power to deal with crimes.  The government can only have the 
rights previously possessed by individuals—namely, self-defense.  Thus, 
criminal law is justified only so long as it protects the society itself.125  
Thus, the social contract theory of punishment is inherently isolationist or 
inward-looking.  
The leading international scholars saw jurisdiction as essentially terri-
torial, though they recognized exceptions for particular crimes.  If someone 
were to commit crimes in his home state and flee to another, the latter can-
not punish him for crimes committed elsewhere.  As Vattel described it, 
“the justice of each nation ought in general to be confined to the punish-
ment of crimes committed in its own territories.”126  Nonetheless, Vattel 
said, “we ought to except from this rule those villains, who, by the nature 
and habitual frequency of their crimes, violate all public security, and de-
clare themselves the enemies of the human race.”127  Because such individu-
als “attack all nations,” they can be punished by all.128  Vattel regarded 
universal jurisdiction as limited and extraordinary.129  Moreover, he viewed 
it as limited to crimes that, like piracy, directly endanger all nations and are 
recognized as universal by international custom. 
The Framers would not likely have thought long on this question with-
out consulting the vastly influential Dutch jurist and publicist Cornelius van 
Bynkershoek.130  He thought the permissibility of universal jurisdiction was 
a “difficult” matter.131  While generally negatively disposed toward it, he 
grudgingly suggested a narrow exception for certain in rem proceedings be-
fore prize courts.  When a nation would bring a prize ship into a third coun-
try’s port, claims could be made against the captor by the alleged proper 
owners of the prize.132  Admiralty courts heard such libels even when the 
                                                                                                                           
Hamilton frequently cited Vattel in his cabinet opinions and public arguments.  See DANIEL GEORGE 
LANG, FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 11, 65 (1985).  
125  See 1 EMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE 
§§ 169, 232 (Joseph Chitty ed., Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1867) (1758). 
126  Id. § 233. 
127  Id.  Vattel cites pirates as the main example of this “exception” in state practice, though he 
seems to wish to extend it to poisoners and “incendiaries by profession.”  Id. 
128  Id. 
129  See id. 
130  His work is often discussed in Founding-era arguments about the law of nations and is cited at 
least twenty times in Supreme Court opinions through 1820.  See, e.g., The Schooner Exchange v. 
McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).  Justice Story described him as “of the highest authority.”  
The Emulous, 8 F. Cas. 697, 701 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 4479).  
131  1 CORNELIUS VAN BYNKERSHOEK, QUESTIONS OF PUBLIC LAW § 129 (1737), in 2 THE 
CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 102 (James Brown Scott ed., Tenney Frank trans., 1930). 
132  Id. 
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claimants and captors were foreign.133  Yet van Bynkershoek only discussed 
criminal or in personam universal jurisdiction in relation to piracy. 
A brief examination of some of the leading writers on international law 
who informed the Framers’ views shows that these scholars regarded uni-
versal jurisdiction as aberrational or problematic.134  Of course, the Framers, 
or subsequent interpreters, were free to diverge from these views with re-
spect to Congress’s powers.  However, given this intellectual background, 
their silence about the jurisdictional scope of the Felonies and Offenses 
power suggests it was at least not intended as granting these powers on a 
universal basis.  
C. Summary 
The little affirmative evidence suggests that universal jurisdiction 
would be in tension with the goals of Clause Ten—providing a uniform rule 
on board U.S. vessels from different states and providing a federal rule and 
remedy for crimes that might be likely to disturb relations between the 
United States. and other nations.  Moreover, allowing for general universal 
jurisdiction over any felony at sea would be in tension with the widespread 
understandings of sovereignty and jurisdiction that informed the Framers.  
While the Constitution could give Congress powers that would conflict with 
these background assumptions, it would require some affirmative evidence 
from the Framing, or strong textual evidence, to conclude that it had done 
so.  In the absence of such evidence, it seems safest to interpret the clause 
consistently with its purposes, the expectations of its authors, and as shown 
in Part II, the likely meaning of its terms to a contemporaneous reader. 
IV. MURDER ON THE HIGH SEAS 
With one exception, Congress did not use the Piracies and Felonies 
Clause to legislate universally over anything but piracy itself until the 
MDLEA.  Given the vast array of foreign high seas conduct that was avail-
 
133  See id.; Eugene Kontorovich, Originalism and the Difficulties of History in Foreign Affairs, 
53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 39, 46–50 (2008) (explaining how admiralty courts functioned in the early Republic 
as international courts exercising universal jurisdiction in matters of captures).  
134  Jeremy Bentham, not surprisingly, had an approach to universal jurisdiction that was quite dif-
ferent from previous commentators.  He had no objection to a country exercising jurisdiction over con-
duct with no nexus to the forum, purely “for the sake of mankind at large.”  See JEREMY BENTHAM, Of 
Subjects, or of the Personal Extent of the Dominion of the Laws, in 2 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 
540, 543 (John Bowring ed., London, Simpkin, Marshal & Co. 1843) (arguing that jurisdiction should be 
based on nothing more than the offender’s physical presence because any other criterion could lead to 
multiple conflicting jurisdictional claims, whereas a person can only be in one place at a time).  Ben-
tham, of course, was not a treatise-writer, and certainly did not purport to describe practice, only an ide-
alized regime of jurisdiction.  Indeed, while Bentham coined the term “international law” in this work, it 
was apparently never cited in the courts of the early Republic.  Furthermore, his work was not available 
to the drafters of the Constitution, as it was only finished in 1789 and published posthumously by his 
executor.  See 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM § VII, supra. 
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able for criminalization in the Age of Sail, this congressional silence itself 
is telling.  As Part V will show, Congress at one point contemplated attach-
ing universal jurisdiction to a nonpiratical felony, but decided such an act 
would be unconstitutional.   
This Part will discuss the only enacted measure that seemed to provide 
universal jurisdiction for felonies.  Some of the leading jurists of the time—
and indeed in the nation’s history—quickly challenged the universal treat-
ment of crimes other than piracy.  The statute eventually occasioned the 
only Supreme Court rulings on the scope of Congress’s power to punish 
crimes without a U.S. nexus.  While there were a couple of inconclusive 
suggestions to the contrary, the preponderance of judicial opinion found 
such legislation as exceeding Congress’s Article I powers.   
The First Congress exercised the Piracies and Felonies power when it 
enacted the first criminal statute in 1790.135  The measure was an omnibus 
act, creating every federal crime, such as treason, counterfeiting, and more 
common crimes committed in areas of exclusive federal authority.136  It pur-
ported to criminalize “murder or robbery” when committed by “any person” 
on the high seas.137  Subsequent sections went on to denominate as piracy a 
variety of maritime misdeeds, such as “running away with a vessel,” revolt, 
assaulting commanders, and attempts and conspiracies to do those things.138 
Robbery on the high seas was the international law crime of piracy, or 
“general” piracy.  But the statute included in the same breath other offenses 
that, while dubbed “piracy,” did not amount to such under international law.  
This itself should not and did not trouble jurists, who clearly distinguished 
between international and statutory, or municipal, piracy.139  The statute, 
however, made no jurisdictional distinction between these provisions.  The 
use of “any person” appears to be an umbrella term, applying equally to 
 
135  An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, 1 Stat. 112, ch. 9 
(1790). 
136  Id.  The bill received little discussion in Congress, with the sections that could be read as estab-
lishing universal jurisdiction apparently going entirely unremarked.  See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE 
CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789–1801, at 93–95 (1997).  
137  Section 8 of the Crimes Act provided that: 
[I]f any person or persons shall commit upon the high seas, or in any river, haven, basin or bay, 
out of the jurisdiction of any particular state, murder or robbery, or any other offence which if 
committed within the body of a county, would by the laws of the United States be punishable with 
death; or if any captain or mariner of any ship or other vessel, shall piratically and feloniously run 
away with such ship or vessel, or any goods or merchandise to the value of fifty dollars, or yield 
up such ship or vessel voluntarily to any pirate; or if any seaman shall lay violent hands upon his 
commander, thereby to hinder and prevent his fighting in defence of his ship or goods committed 
to his trust, or shall make a revolt in the ship; every such offender shall be deemed, taken and ad-
judged to be a pirate and felon, and being thereof convicted, shall suffer death; and the trial of 
crimes committed on the high seas, or in any place out of the jurisdiction of any particular state, 
shall be in the district where the offender is apprehended, or into which he may first be brought. 
1 Stat. 112, ch. 9, § 8 (emphasis added). 
138  Id. §§ 9–12.  
139  See Joseph Story, A Charge Delivered to the Grand Juries of the Circuit Court (1819), reprinted 
in 1 THE AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE AND AMERICAN COURTS 1, 2 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1988).  
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robbery as well as all the other enumerated offenses.  A literal reading 
would extend U.S. jurisdiction universally to a wide variety of crimes 
aboard any vessel on the high seas, and even to some offenses on land.  
None of these crimes were universally cognizable.  It is unlikely that Con-
gress intended the law to have such broad reach.  Given the narrowness 
with which it otherwise tailored its criminal powers, there is no indication 
that Congress sought to begin its career by legislating a criminal code for all 
ships around the world.140  The reasons, if any, for the language are un-
known.141  Several courts blamed it on shoddy draftsmanship,142 which 
would have been understandable given the massive work of the First Con-
gress. 
A. Grand Jury Charges 
The statute immediately raised doubts as to its legality, which persisted 
until they were resolved by the Supreme Court in 1820.  The year after its 
enactment, two Supreme Court Justices discussed it while giving grand jury 
instructions.  At the time, grand jury charges were lengthy disquisitions on 
criminal law, the Constitution, the role of the jury, and related political mat-
ters.143  Justice James Wilson surveyed the entire corpus of federal criminal 
law—all thirty-two sections of the Act of 1790—for the edification of the 
Virginia grand jurors.144 
Upon reaching section 8 of the Act, Wilson expressed “an official ob-
ligation to state some doubts” about the statute’s apparent extension of uni-
versal jurisdiction beyond classic piracy.145  These doubts consume the next 
three pages of his instructions.  While noting his “diffidence” to the “power 
 
140  See Anonymous Case, 1 F. Cas. 999, 1003 (C.C.D. Mo. 1843) (No. 447) (“In some of its provi-
sions, the words, if literally and strictly taken, go far beyond what could have been the intention of the 
writer; and the act has in some respects copied too closely the act of 39 Geo. III., without adverting to 
the difference in our constitutions.”). 
141  The 1781 statute establishing federal courts for high seas crimes described their jurisdiction as 
extending to “all and every person and persons who . . . hereafter shall commit, any piracy or felony 
upon the high seas.” Ordinance for Establishing Courts for the Trial of Piracies and Felonies Commit-
ted on the High Seas, supra note 58, at 355 (emphasis added).  No one has contended that this provision 
sought to grant universal jurisdiction over the high seas to the newly created courts.  Interestingly, the 
similar language of the 1781 ordinance was never mentioned in the decades-long debate over the scope 
of its 1790 replacement.  If anything, the earlier enactment used even broader language.  See id. at 354–
55.   
142  See United States v. Bowers, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 191, 195 (1820) (bemoaning “the obvious want 
of precision in language and in thought, discoverable in the act of 1790”); Anonymous Case, 1 F.Cas. at 
1003 (“The act of 1790 was very unskillfully written.”). 
143  See Ruth Wedgwood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom of Jonathan Robbins, 100 YALE L.J. 229, 
243 n.37 (1990) (noting that grand jury charges were often “political events” reprinted verbatim in 
newspapers). 
144  See James Wilson, Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of Virginia 
(May 1791), in 3 WORKS OF THE HON. JAMES WILSON 354 (Philadelphia, Lorenzo Press 1804). 
145  Id. at 374. 
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and legislative authority of the United States,” he suggested the murder 
provisions of the law went beyond such power.146  Wilson noted the well-
known distinction between general piracy and other maritime crimes that a 
nation may penalize.  This distinction existed regardless of whether the lat-
ter are dubbed “piracies” by statute.  If a nation wished to legislate beyond 
the international law definition, it could do so in cases “affecting only its 
citizens.”147 
As to section 8, Wilson first urged a narrower reading of the murder 
provision, arguing that Congress could not have meant to give the same 
reach to the laws of piracy and murder, given the well-known difference be-
tween them.148  If, however, Congress did mean the law “to extend, in its 
operation, to persons not citizens of the United States,” Justice Wilson sug-
gested it “could not be carried into effect” by the courts.149  While his 
charge repeatedly invoked the “law of nations” and did not cite the Consti-
tution, this last sentence suggests that Wilson, who had been a delegate to 
the Constitutional Convention, understood the limitation to be constitu-
tional.  Wilson, like most lawyers at the time, saw international law as part 
of the common law background against which the Constitution and federal 
laws must be construed.  Yet even the strongest supporters of this view 
conceded that both the Constitution and laws of the United States trumped 
contrary customary international law.150  Thus, if the Define and Punish 
Clause authorized universal jurisdiction over any high seas crimes, Con-
gress would be entitled to exercise such jurisdiction despite the conflict 
with international law.  There was no authority other than the Constitution 
for invalidating a statute, as Wilson said he would do. 
Justice Iredell adverted to the issue in a much more cursory discussion 
and came to a different conclusion.  Addressing the New Jersey grand jury 
two years later, he suggested that international law principles bear directly 
on the scope of Clause Ten.  Unlike Wilson, he maintained that all nations 
share a common jurisdiction over all high seas crimes, though he offered no 
 
146  Id. 
147  Id. at 376.  This view construed jurisdiction more narrowly than anyone else would, as it would 
presumably prevent the punishment of foreigners on U.S. vessels. 
148  Id. at 374–77.  Marshall would reject this approach, as it would require giving a common cha-
peau provision, “any person,” different meaning when applied to two different subsequent terms.  In-
stead of narrowing the scope of “any person” as applied to murder, he chose to narrow “any person” 
itself.  While this is in some tension with the plain language, it at least allows the plain language to mean 
one thing, rather than have some Heisenberg-like property.  See infra text accompanying notes 184–187, 
194–206.   
149  Id. at 377.  The statement also is important as an overlooked early foreshadowing of the judicial 
review that would come into clear view in Marbury v. Madison. 
150  See Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 449 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
the Constitution trumps contrary international law, because “unquestionably the people of the United 
States had a right to form what kind of union, and upon what terms they pleased, without reference to 
any former examples”). 
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basis for the view.151  In a subsequent charge, he suggested that the United 
States had universal jurisdiction over at least certain nonpiratical crimes on 
the high seas.152  Anticipating modern universal jurisdiction, which is based 
on the heinousness of the crime, he said that “murder or piracy” could be 
punished by any nation because they are “so atrocious in their nature” that 
“all nations concur in punishing them” and because the high seas are out-
side the jurisdiction of any particular nation.153  He did not explain how this 
fits with Clause Ten, which mentions piracy but not murder.  Surely if mur-
der were universally cognizable, it would not have become so in the few 
years since the Philadelphia Convention.  His first, broader jury charge sug-
gested a belief in a jus gentium, a “universal law of society” that the United 
States, like all other nations, merely applies in admiralty cases.154 
These views are somewhat inconsistent with each other and hard to 
understand on their own terms, as they conflict with the well-established 
contemporary view that only piracy was universally cognizable.155  More-
over, it is in tension with views he expressed during the ratification suggest-
ing that the purpose of Clause Ten was to reach crimes committed by or 
against Americans.156  The suggestion that high seas were an “extraterrito-
rial” jurisdiction also had little basis.  While the “high seas” themselves 
could not be regulated by any nation, ships were literal extensions of a na-
tion’s territory.157   
Wilson thought that he would soon see a case testing the scope of the 
Crimes Act.  Such a case did not arise directly until the late 1810s.  In 1819, 
 
151  Iredell, supra note 105 at 355 (“[Congress] has express authority given in the Constitution to de-
fine and punish Piracies and Felonies . . . and Offences [committed] against the law of nations.  Crimes 
that are committed upon the High Seas, are not the objects of any Law merely territorial, that is, a Law 
resting entirely on the discretion of the Legislature of the Country, but being Crimes equally against all 
the Nations in the world, are equally punishable in any, and therefore must have some common princi-
ple.”). 
152  James Iredell, Charge to Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of South Carolina 
(May 7, 1798) [hereinafter Iredell, South Carolina Grand Jury Charge], in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 105, at 258.  Iredell does not mention the Crimes Act directly, and 
thus it is not clear how focused he was on the universality issue.  His discussion of high seas crimes was 
apparently prompted by the involvement of Americans in French vessels operating against the British 
off the Carolina shore.  See Letter from James Iredell to Hanna Iredell (May 8, 1798), in 3 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 105, at 263. 
153  Iredell, South Carolina Grand Jury Charge, supra note 152. 
154  Iredell, supra note 105 (“Laws concerning crimes of this nature ought to be materially the same 
in every country.”).  
155  Cf. Wedgwood, supra note 143, at 240–41 & n.29 (explaining that some Enlightenment thinkers 
had a “lingering” belief that all law was universal, with each nation attempting to understand the same 
general law as all others, and thus there would be nothing unfair about applying jurisdiction to foreign-
ers because jurisdictional differences were of little consequence).   
156  See Iredell, supra note 115. 
157  See, e.g., United States v. Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 631, 641 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No. 14,865) (Chase, 
J.) (charging the jury: “All vessels, whether public or private, are part of the territory and within the ju-
risdiction of the nation to which they belong.  This is according to the law of nations.”). 
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Justice Story delivered instructions to a grand jury that directly anticipated 
the controversies of the coming year.  Story adopted and expanded Wil-
son’s narrow view of universal jurisdiction over Iredell’s broader concep-
tion.158  Story stated that the statute “is manifestly designed to apply to all 
cases,” including foreigners on foreign ships.  However, crimes merely 
called “piracy” by U.S. law are punishable only when there is American in-
volvement.159  Story thus distinguished between Congress’s power to punish 
piracy as defined by the law of nations and other crimes, regardless of 
whether the statute called them “piracy.”  This insistence on the distinction 
between piracy proper and everything else directly corresponds to the con-
stitutional distinction between piracies and felonies.  
B. John Marshall and Jonathan Robbins 
1. The Robbins Affair.—The Jonathan Robbins affair—a highly poli-
ticized dispute over the extradition of a mutineer to Britain—resulted in the 
first extended discussion of the scope of Congress’s high seas criminal ju-
risdiction.  The Robbins flap pulled in the courts, the President, Congress, 
and the press.  At its climax, freshman legislator John Marshall delivered an 
extraordinary speech on the floor of the House, which demonstrated a defi-
nite view of the Piracies and Felonies provision, closely anticipating the 
views he would express from the bench two decades later in the only cases 
squarely dealing with the issue.  
In 1797, mutineers overthrew (overboard) the officers of the British 
warship Hermione.160  The brutality of the revolt made Britain particularly 
intent on bringing the perpetrators to justice.  In subsequent years, some of 
the crew, now on other vessels, wound up in American ports, where they 
were arrested.  In March 1798, three of the mutineers were arrested in Perth 
Amboy.  One was apparently an American, while the other two were proba-
bly foreigners;161 the concept of nationality was fuzzier at the time, and par-
ticularly difficult to apply to immigrants like Americans and migrants like 
seamen.  Britain immediately requested their extradition under the Jay 
Treaty, which required both countries to “deliver up to justice [in the other 
country], all persons, who, being charged with murder or forgery committed 
within the jurisdiction of either, shall seek an asylum within any of the 
countries of the other.”162   
 
158  See Story, supra note 139. 
159  Id. 
160  The discussion of the background to the Robbins affair is drawn from Wedgwood, supra note 
143, at 235–38. 
161  But see Extradition, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 83 (Mar. 14, 1798) (suggesting that all three may have 
been Americans). 
162  Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. XXVII, Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat. 
116, 129 [hereinafter Jay Treaty]. 
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The extradition request was considered at the highest levels of gov-
ernment.  A question immediately arose about the meaning of “jurisdic-
tion.”  Certainly, a British frigate was manifestly within His Majesty’s 
jurisdiction.  The United States had some proprietary jurisdictional claim 
with respect to the American defendant, but not the other two.  If “jurisdic-
tion of either” meant each nation’s exclusive jurisdiction, then the treaty 
would not require extradition in cases where the crime fell within both na-
tions’ jurisdictions.  With respect to the foreigners, their mutiny on a British 
warship could only be within U.S. jurisdiction if it was universally cogniza-
ble and if the Constitution would allow the punishment of such “foreign” 
crimes in American courts.  
2. Opinions on U.S. Jurisdiction.—Attorney General Charles Lee 
and Secretary of State Timothy Pickering disagreed on this last point.163  In 
a brief opinion, Lee wrote that the 1790 Crimes Act allowed the punishment 
of murder on the high seas even though one of the mutineers was possibly 
foreign.164  He did not explain how such jurisdiction would be consistent 
with the Constitution or law of nations.165  However, the mutineers had not 
merely seized the vessel, but also sold it to the Spanish, thus robbing the 
ship owners.166  Because Lee’s letter dealt with both murder and piracy, he 
could still have regarded U.S. jurisdiction as based fundamentally on the 
latter.  He could have seen the case as an exercise of pendent jurisdiction.167  
On the other hand, like Iredell’s second jury instruction, he may have 
thought murder was also universally cognizable under international law.  
Lee’s view did not prevail.  The defendants were indicted for piracy 
before a federal grand jury.  Only the undisputedly American defendant was 
charged with murder, despite Lee’s broad views about the reach of section 8 
of the Crimes Act.  Piracy was not only universally cognizable, it was also 
not extraditable by the terms of the Jay Treaty.  Indeed, another provision 
clearly contemplated that each country would itself punish pirates against 
the other when found within their respective territories.168  This case was not 
the best vehicle for disentangling the treatment of piracy from murder, as 
they allegedly occurred together.  (Whether mutiny counted as piracy in in-
 
163  Extradition, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 83. 
164  Id. at 84 (“I deem it more becoming the justice, honor, and dignity of the United States, that the 
trial should be in our courts.”); see also Wedgwood, supra note 143, at 277–78 (describing Lee’s view 
that murder and piracy can be punished “on board any vessel whatever”). 
165  Professor Rubin sees in the tone of the remark more bombast than analysis.  See ALFRED P. 
RUBIN, THE LAW OF PIRACY 142 (2d ed. 1998) (“[I]t seems likely that Lee was making a broader argu-
ment for new national pride and policy reasons than a closer examination of the case and more mature 
judgment would warrant.”). 
166  See Wedgwood, supra note 143, at 272 n.162. 
167  See id. 
168  Jay Treaty, supra note 162, art. XX, 8 Stat. at 126–27. 
103:149  (2009) The “Define and Punish” Clause and Universal Jurisdiction 
 181 
ternational law was itself unclear.)  A brief trial resulted in an acquittal after 
twenty minutes of deliberations.169 
The fate of Robbins took an entirely different course and inspired dif-
ferent legal views.  In February 1799, a certain Nathan or Jonathan Robbins 
was arrested in Charleston, South Carolina.  He was said to be Thomas 
Nash, one of the Hermione mutineers.  Britain immediately requested his 
extradition.  Again, Lee’s views were disregarded.  Pickering recommended 
extraditing Nash.  Adams agreed that the United States had no jurisdiction 
of crimes committed by foreigners on foreign vessels.  In a brief note he 
“advize[d] and requested” the federal judge before whom Nash had come to 
hand him over to the British.170   
Nash promptly began a habeas proceeding in which he made a last-
minute claim that he was actually an American national, Jonathan Robbins, 
who had been impressed onto the Hermione.  While it lacked any eviden-
tiary support, this charge succeeded in arousing popular sentiments on his 
behalf.171  Impressments of American sailors were already a source of bit-
terness, and the idea that a kidnapped American who regained his liberty 
through force should be returned to brutal British naval justice seemed an 
outrage and a perversion.172  Judge Bee was openly skeptical of these claims 
and saw them as tactics to arouse anti-extradition passions.173  While he sug-
gested, again without explanation, that U.S. courts would have jurisdiction 
over Nash,174 the bulk of the evidence and witnesses would be in British 
hands, and Nash was rendered to them.  Shortly thereafter he was summa-
rily court-martialed in Jamaica, executed, and hung in chains.175  
The treatment of Nash—now Robbins or Robins in the press—quickly 
became a national scandal.  Robbins became a martyr, and when Adams’s 
letter to Bee became public, he became the villain in the drama.  The event 
 
169  The precise circumstances of the New Jersey proceeding, such as the nationalities of the defen-
dants and the basis for jurisdiction, were obscure and would be a subject of much controversy in the 
congressional debates.  Supporters of Adams argued that the jury acquitted precisely because, “being 
judges of law as well as fact,” they considered the prosecution a jurisdictional overreach.  10 ANNALS OF 
CONG. 592 (1800).  Gallatin and other critics of the administration’s actions argued that the indictment 
of the three showed there was no jurisdictional impediment to prosecuting Robbins in U.S. courts.  Id. at 
594. 
170  See United States v. Robins, 27 F. Cas. 825, 838 (D.S.C. 1799) (No. 16,175). 
171  See Wedgwood, supra note 143, at 323–35 (discussing how the issue of Robbins’s claim of citi-
zenship was used by politicians to gain favor in the upcoming elections). 
172  See id. at 353.  
173  See id. at 299–302. 
174  Robins, 27 F. Cas. at 832–33 (“There is no doubt that the circuit courts of the United States have 
a concurrent jurisdiction, and this arises under the general law of nations; and if the 27th clause of the 
treaty in question had not expressly declared the right to demand, and the obligation to deliver over, the 
prisoner must have been tried here.”).  As with Lee, Bee does not make clear whether U.S. courts would 
have jurisdiction without the presence of a piracy charge.   
175  Wedgwood, supra note 143, at 304.  In the British proceedings, he confessed to being an Irish-
man.  Id. at 304–05. 
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prompted massive outrage that was partly the product of broader resentment 
of the Adams administration and British high-handedness on the high 
seas.176  The House promptly instituted proceedings to censure Adams for 
his ex parte role in the matter.  
3. Marshall’s Decisive Speech.—After days of debate, Marshall took 
the floor.  His long speech effectively ended the discussion and turned the 
tide against censure.  It immediately became famous and was widely re-
printed.177  Courtroom arguments would cite the speech alongside judicial 
precedents: “[T]hough delivered by a Congressman, [the speech] was to be 
awarded constitutional place in the Appendix of Wheaton’s Supreme Court 
opinions . . . .”178 
Marshall’s remarks on the subject show how early he had formulated 
his view and help flesh out the opinions he subsequently delivered from the 
bench.  In discussing the extent of American jurisdiction, he presented a 
definite view of the Crimes Act.  On the Court, he would not encounter a 
case that posed this question until twenty years later—a case he decided 
consistently with the views he first expressed on the House floor.  
The jurisdictional arguments played a relatively small role in Rob-
bins’s habeas case, and even less in the subsequent debate on the propriety 
of the rendering.  The major issues concerned the executive involvement in 
the decision, the propriety of extraditing “Americans,” the legitimacy of 
mutiny by impressed sailors, and the various inadequacies in the evidence 
against Nash.  Nonetheless, in the protracted and heated floor debate, Mar-
shall’s able opponents had no response to his jurisdictional arguments.  
Marshall devoted more attention to the jurisdictional argument than 
any of the other speakers.  He began by noting that the case obviously fell 
within British jurisdiction; the only question was whether the United States 
enjoyed concurrent power on the theory that “at sea all nations have a com-
mon jurisdiction.”179  He denied this position as a matter of international 
law, citing treaties and the past practice of the United States in support:  
 It is not true that all nations have jurisdiction over all offences committed at 
sea.  On the contrary, no nation has any jurisdiction at sea, but over its own 
citizens or vessels, or offences against itself.180 
A contrary rule would have had absurd consequences.  Could the 
United States punish desertion by British seamen from a British to a French 
vessel, or pickpocketing among British sailors?  Such a general jurisdiction 
 
176  See generally Wedgwood, supra note 143. 
177  See id. at 355–57. 
178  Id. at 234 n.3.  Similarly, an earlier version of Marshall’s speech, published as a letter in a Vir-
ginia newspaper, was reprinted as an appendix to the report of the district court case.  Robins, 27 F. Cas. 
at 833. 
179  10 ANNALS OF CONG. 598 (1800). 
180  Id. 
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over high seas offenses had never been suggested.181  Thus Marshall demon-
strated that Lee’s broad statements proved too much.  Without some limit-
ing principle to distinguish murder from all other crimes, it would seem that 
nations could either exercise complete jurisdiction over the entire conduct 
of foreign vessels or none at all:  
It follows, then, that no such common jurisdiction exists. 
 In truth the right of every nation to punish is limited, in its nature, to of-
fences against the nation inflicting the punishment.  This principle is believed 
to be universally true.182 
Any casual conflation of murder and robbery jurisdiction, Marshall ex-
plained, stems from neglecting the distinction between international and 
statutory piracy: 
[A]n offence which in its nature affects only a particular nation, is only pun-
ishable by that nation.  It is by confounding general piracy with piracy by stat-
ute, that indistinct ideas have been produced, respecting the power to punish 
offences committed on the high seas.  A statute may make any offence piracy, 
committed within the jurisdiction of the nation passing the statute, and such of-
fence will be punishable by that nation.  But piracy under the law of nations 
. . . alone is punishable by all nations . . . .  No particular nation can increase or 
diminish the list of offences thus punishable.183 
While U.S. courts could have jurisdiction over Nash’s piratical crime, they 
could not prosecute him for murder.  Of course, Marshall had to say some-
thing about the Crimes Act, which by its terms applied to murder on the 
high seas “by any person” and was not limited to American vessels.  Mar-
shall forcefully replied that the Act did not and could apply on a universal 
basis.   
Congress could not have wanted to sweep in foreign causes.  But even 
if it did, it could not: “Any general expression in a legislative act must, nec-
essarily, be restrained to objects within the jurisdiction of the legislature 
passing the act.”184  He then turned to the statute for further evidence of its 
limited application.  He first looked to the title, which spoke of “crimes 
against the United States.”  Then he looked at the variety of statutory pira-
cies to which the “any person” language equally applied.  They included 
misprision of treason, running away with a vessel, and striking an officer.  
But surely the United States could not punish misprision of treason by a 
Frenchman against France; nor could it punish a French capture of a British 
ship, though this might involve both striking an officer and running away 
 
181  Id. at 599 (“A common jurisdiction over all offences at sea, in whatever vessel committed, 
would involve the power of punishing the offences which have been stated.  Yet, all gentlemen will dis-
claim this power.”). 
182  Id. at 599–600. 
183  Robins, 27 F. Cas. at 862. 
184  Id. at 863. 
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with a vessel.185  In other words, as even the opposition had conceded, such 
offenses were outside U.S. jurisdiction,186 and the words “any person” were 
either intended to be limited or required limitation throughout the statute.  A 
literal reading could not be sustained throughout the statute because, despite 
the moral appeal of universal jurisdiction for murder, the jurisdictional dis-
tinction between piracies and felonies had to be maintained, even against 
Congress’s will.187 
Thus far, Marshall’s argument against universal jurisdiction beyond pi-
racy rested solely on international and general law grounds.188  Yet at the 
end of the discussion, Marshall made it exceedingly clear that this limita-
tion was embedded in the Define and Punish Clause itself.  While the limi-
tation may have begun in the law of nations, it was cemented by the 
framing of the Constitution, which gave Congress only limited powers, 
amongst which universal jurisdiction was not one: 
[The Define and Punish] clause can never be construed to make to the Gov-
ernment a grant of power, which the people making it do not themselves pos-
sess.  It has already been shown that the people of the United States have no 
jurisdiction over offences committed on board a foreign ship against a foreign 
nation.  Of consequence, in framing a Government for themselves, they cannot 
have passed this jurisdiction to that Government.  The law [the Crimes Act], 
therefore, cannot act upon the case.  But this clause of the Constitution cannot 
be considered, and need not be considered, as affecting acts which are piracy 
under the law of nations.189 
Because Robbins was extradited, the question of jurisdiction escaped 
the courts.  It would take another twenty years before a prosecution would 
proceed against a foreigner for a murder on a foreign vessel.  Marshall 
would repeat, perhaps less lucidly, his arguments about the statute’s title 
and the inapplicability of universal jurisdiction to statutory “piracies.”  Yet 
the opinion in that case seems crabbed, almost as if it were referring back to 
some longer exposition of the idea.  That exposition, it turns out, was his 
celebrated House address.  This gives valuable context to the subsequent 
opinions, which were sketchy on the source of the jurisdictional limitation.  
The House speech was an extraordinary success and attracted great at-
tention.  It was “said by Judge Story to be among the very ablest arguments 
on record, and . . . [it] temporarily silenced opposition.”190  It had the imme-
diate effect of saving Adams from censure.  A few months later, Adams 
chose Marshall to replace Pickering and then shortly thereafter elevated him 
to the Court. 
 
185  10 ANNALS OF CONG. 603–04 (1800). 
186  Id. at 602. 
187  Id. at 602–04. 
188  See id. at 599–606.  
189  Id. at 607 (emphasis added). 
190  United States v. Robins, 27 F. Cas. 825, 860–61 (D.S.C. 1799) (No. 16,175). 
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C. The Crimes Act in the Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court has only dealt with the scope of Congress’s author-
ity to criminalize universally in a few cases decided within a few weeks of 
each other.  It concluded that Congress’s power to define and punish en-
tirely foreign conduct only applied to piratical offenses. 
In the 1810s, numerous Latin American colonies had revolted against 
Spain.  With the collapse of governmental authority, a variety of fly-by-
night insurgent republics freely issued letters of marque of dubious validity 
to shady characters in order to field some naval force against Spanish ship-
ping.  These “privateers” were often indiscriminate in their targets and, 
along with open pirates encouraged by the anarchy, significantly disrupted 
American commerce.  These privateers usually had some American connec-
tion—either sailing from Baltimore or having Americans among the crew—
but this connection would often be difficult to prove after a long and circui-
tous voyage. 
1. United States v. Palmer.—Palmer involved classic international 
law piracy—the armed robbery of a Spanish vessel.191  Some of the defen-
dants were American, some not, and their original ship was apparently for-
eign.  With respect to the foreign defendants, this would be the perfect case 
for universal jurisdiction.  The 1790 piracy statute applied by its terms to 
“any persons.”  Marshall began his discussion by squarely holding that the 
Define and Punish Clause allows Congress to deal with pirates “although 
they may be foreigners, and may have committed no particular offence 
against the United States.”192  The Constitution thus entitled Congress to 
deal with the one universal jurisdiction crime on a universal jurisdiction ba-
sis. 
Yet despite the constitutionality and international legality of such ju-
risdiction, Marshall held that the statute’s general language was not in-
tended to reach even robbery on the high seas—general piracy—unless it 
had a U.S. nexus.  Marshall suggested at least two reasons for such a nar-
row and seemingly artificial interpretation—both lines of thought that he 
had previously expressed in Congress during the Robbins affair.  First, 
Marshall considered the title of the statute—“An Act for the Punishment of 
certain Crimes against the United States.”  He concluded that Congress 
could not have put under such a heading “offences against the human 
race.”193  But the statute in question was simply the complete criminal code 
of the United States; the piracy provisions were just a few among its thirty-
two separate sections, punishing a variety of common crimes committed in 
federal enclaves.  The title might capture the overarching purpose of the 
provisions as a whole.  It is less obvious that the title, adopted without de-
 
191  United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 611 (1818).  
192  Id. at 630. 
193  Id. at 631. 
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liberation, should by itself limit particular terms to less than their plain 
meaning.  As the title is not an operative provision, a conflict between it 
and the plain language of the statute could arguably go to the latter. 
More compelling is Marshall’s second argument.194  Section 8 lists a 
variety of offenses as piracy, starting with the classic “robbery on the high 
seas,” but extending also to captains making off with their vessels and even 
sailors assaulting their commanders.  The latter two offenses were not pi-
racy according to the law of nations, and thus not universally cognizable.195  
Marshall suggested that Congress could not have intended the Act to apply 
to such crimes.  Yet this conclusion flies in the face of the text: the “all per-
sons” phrase refers to all crimes in section 8.  Thus if “all persons” means 
universal jurisdiction for robbery, it would also mean universal jurisdiction 
for the other crimes, which “are offences against the nation under whose 
flag the vessel sails, and within whose particular jurisdiction all on board 
the vessel are. . . . [A]nd no general words of a statute ought to be construed 
to embrace them when committed by foreigners against a foreign govern-
ment.”196  Because “any persons” would lead to absurd results if taken liter-
ally with regard to most of the listed offenses, it would have to take a 
nonliteral meaning with regard to piracy itself. 
Marshall never directly addressed the question of whether Congress 
had constitutional authority to apply the various provisions of section 8 uni-
versally.  Instead, he merely held that Congress could not have intended to 
do so in the Crimes Act.  Congress had no discernible interest in regulating 
revolts by foreign seamen on a foreign vessel.  So statutory language not-
withstanding, it presumably did not try to extend its jurisdiction to such 
purely foreign causes,197 and this must mean that “any persons” means less 
than “any.”  
Still, Marshall’s analysis borrowed heavily from his argument about 
Jonathan Robbins twenty years earlier, though in somewhat abbreviated 
form.198  It seems safe to conclude from his reiteration of the same argu-
ments and examples that the holding of Palmer was guided by his earlier 
 
194  Id. at 631–33. 
195  See Story, supra note 139, at 2–3. 
196  Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 632–33. 
197  Id. at 631–32.  The example recalls the Robins case. 
198  Indeed, Palmer may allude directly to the speech.  After giving various examples of how reading 
the Act’s broad language to allow for universal jurisdiction would produce absurd results, Marshall con-
cludes that the point “might be still farther illustrated by animadversions on other sections of the Act.”  
Id. at 633.  Of course, in his Robbins speech, he did draw examples from other sections of the Act, like 
section 6.  See 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 603 (1800).  Given the wide circulation of the speech, this may be 
why Marshall thought a recitation of all the examples would be “tedious” and “unnecessary.”  Palmer, 
16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 633. 
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view that the Define and Punish Clause did not allow Congress to extend 
the jurisdictional status of piracy to municipal felonies.199  
One must appreciate how nonobvious and perhaps strained Marshall’s 
statutory construction was.  It was clear to most observers that Congress 
had intended to punish piracy to the full extent sovereign nations punish 
it—universally.200  Indeed, the statute had in prior cases been used to hang 
foreign pirates for crimes committed on foreign vessels.201  There was no 
evidence that Congress had wanted to depart from the general practice of 
nations in this regard.  Rather, it had simply written an ungainly statute that 
inadvertently extended piracy jurisdiction to other crimes as well.202  
The strain Marshall’s reading placed on the text and legislative intent 
drew extraordinarily sharp words from John Quincy Adams: 
[The Court’s] reasoning is a sample of judicial logic—disingenuous, false, and 
hollow . . . .  [I]f human language means anything, Congress had made general 
piracy, by whomsoevever and wheresoever . . . cognizable by the Circuit 
Court.203  
The inability to prosecute pirates universally was an “enormous hole in the 
moral garment of this nation made by this desperate thrust of the Supreme 
Court.”204 
Marshall recognized that his reading of the statute was difficult.  Any 
consistent reading of “any person” would frustrate one of Congress’s inten-
tions.  Marshall did not adopt the broader reading, even though it had more 
support in the text.  His interpretation is an evident attempt to find a limit-
ing construction.  The textual difficulty and policy embarrassment created 
by the opinion show that there must have been a significant countervailing 
value that required Marshall’s “captious subtleties.”205  
Indeed, Justice Johnson and the U.S. Attorney, who naturally argued 
for broad U.S. jurisdiction, thought that the Constitution itself imposed a 
limit on the reach of Congress’s jurisdiction over anything but piracy.  
Blake, the prosecutor, conceded that “all persons” could be taken literally as 
applied to the latter crimes in section 8.  He suggested splitting the differ-
ence, reading “all persons” literally as applied to robbery, but reading it 
 
199  In explaining Palmer to a grand jury the next year, Justice Story reaffirmed that, according to the 
law of nations, only the piracy provision of the criminal statute could apply universally.  See Story, su-
pra note 139 (“[N]o nation can have any right by its own legislation to bind the subjects of foreign gov-
ernments as to offences which fall within the exclusive cognizance of such government.”).  
200  See 4 JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 363 (Charles Francis Adams 
ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1875). 
201  Id. 
202  See supra notes 141–142 and accompanying text.   
203  ADAMS, supra note 200, at 363. 
204  Id. 
205  Id. at 362–63. 
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Marshall’s way with respect to the other crimes.206  What this lacked in ele-
gance it would make up for in fidelity to Congress’s intent.  Moreover, he 
argued, the Constitution “conferred” upon Congress the power and “duty” 
to punish “real” piracy regardless of nexus.207  It did not, he agreed, give 
them such power over “[a] felony, which is made a piracy by municipal 
statutes.”208  Finally, Justice Johnson’s separate opinion209 apparently re-
ferred to limitations inherent in the Define and Punish power.210  He argued 
that Congress is entirely disabled from exercising universal jurisdiction be-
yond what was permitted by international law; because international law 
was regarded as a presumptive but not absolute bar to contrary legislation, 
Johnson’s statement suggests that he regarded the obstacle as constitutional.  
2. United States v. Klintock211.—Congress responded immediately to 
Palmer by passing a supplemental law clearly establishing universal juris-
diction over sea robbery.212  The clarifying statute expired at the end of the 
next year.  Remarkably, legislation to extend the 1819 Act failed to do so 
because of the latter measure’s own inarticulate draftsmanship.213  In the 
end, the language of the 1790 Act remained the governing law, despite two 
attempts by Congress to make piracy universally cognizable.214  
Against this background the Court heard the case of Ralph Klintock.  
The defendant was an American captain of a privateer in the service of an 
unrecognized Latin American rebel leader who had piratically attacked a 
Danish ship.215  The case fell squarely within the purposes of Congress’s 
 
206  United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 617–618 (1818) (Argument of Mr. Blake for 
the United States). 
207  Id. at 620. 
208  Id. (emphasis added). 
209  He wrote separately to differ on certain other points and to criticize Marshall for discussing is-
sues not raised by the case.  Id. at 636–37, 641 (Johnson, J.).  
210  Id. at 641–42 (“Congress can inflict punishment on offences committed on board the vessels of 
the United States, or by citizens of the United States, any where; but congress cannot make that piracy 
which is not piracy by the law of nations, in order to give jurisdiction to its own courts over such of-
fences.”  (emphasis added)).  But see KENT, supra note 123, at 175 (“This decision [in Palmer] was ac-
cording to the law and practice of nations . . . .”).  Kent’s discussion of Congress’s constitutional 
authority under Clause Ten is not clearly separate from his views on its authority under international 
law.  Id. at 172–74. 
211  18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144 (1820). 
212  Act of March 3, 1819, ch. 77, § 5, 3 Stat. 510, 513–14 (1819) (clarifying intent to assert univer-
sal jurisdiction over piracy through language stating “[t]hat if any person or persons whatsoever, shall, 
on the high seas, commit the crime of piracy, as defined by the law of nations . . . .”  (emphasis added)).  
See generally United States v. Chapels, 25 F. Cas. 399 (C.C.D. Va. 1819) (No. 14,782) (discussing 
background to the 1819 Act). 
213  The law provided that the 1819 Act would “continue in effect,” which was intended to mean in-
definitely, but the continuation was brief because, by its own terms, the 1819 statute’s “effect” ended in 
1820.  3 Stat. at 514.   
214  United States v. Kessler, 26 F. Cas. 766, 774 (C.C.D. Pa. 1821) (No. 15,528) (holding that the 
reauthorized Crimes Act still did not provide universal jurisdiction over piracy). 
215  Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 144–45. 
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Define and Punish power—bringing Americans to justice for offenses 
against foreign countries.  Yet for no readily apparent reason, the Certificate 
in Palmer had described jurisdiction as entirely depending on the national-
ity of the vessel.216  Klintock’s lawyer seized on this to argue that Palmer 
controlled the case and thus prevented any jurisdiction over foreign vessels.  
And while it was clear from the 1819 amendment that Congress wished to 
reach purely foreign piracy, the conduct had occurred in 1818.217  
The Chief Justice found a way to sustain jurisdiction without explicitly 
overruling Palmer.  While Palmer precluded punishing piracy on foreign 
vessels, it did not address the question of a vessel having no nationality—
that is, of a ship “in possession of a crew acting in defiance of all law, and 
acknowledging obedience to no government whatever.”218  This description 
happens to fit pirates to a tee, because they “renounced all the benefits of 
society and government.”219  Thus the statelessness fiction allowed Marshall 
to get the best of both worlds, applying the Crimes Act to piracies against 
foreign vessels without universalizing other crimes.  If Congress can punish 
piracy by any piratical vessel, then the mischief done by Palmer would be 
largely remedied simply by calling pirate ships “stateless.”  The Court had 
to vindicate this power through the indirect route of “statelessness” because 
of the odd combination of artless drafting in 1790, the gloss put on those 
words by Palmer, and more artless drafting in 1819.  
3. United States v. Furlong220.—Furlong involved multiple cases 
against multiple sets of defendants, certified from various circuit courts and 
decided together.221  The crew of the privateer Louisa, apparently an Ameri-
can-owned vessel in the service of the self-styled “Republic of Bueneos 
Aryes,” forcibly seized their vessel and began a piratical cruise.  Along the 
way, they attacked both American and foreign vessels.  While most of the 
pirate crew was American, Furlong was an Irish national.  Apart from vari-
ous crimes committed against American vessels, he was charged with rob-
bery and murder aboard an English ship.222 
 
216  United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 643 (1818) (“This court is further of opinion, 
that the crime of robbery, committed by a person on the high seas, on board of any ship or vessel be-
longing exclusively to subjects of a foreign state, on persons within a vessel belonging exclusively to 
subjects of a foreign state, is not a piracy within the true intent and meaning of the act, entitled, ‘an act 
for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States.’”).  The opinion itself had discussed ju-
risdiction as being dependent on the nationality either of the parties or of the vessel, and the reason for 
the omission of the former basis from the Certificate is unclear.  It is, however, in keeping with a state-
ment Marshall made in the Robbins affair, though the basis for that statement is equally unclear.  See 
Wedgwood, supra note 143, at 346 n.451. 
217  Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 148–49. 
218  Id. at 152. 
219  BLACKSTONE, supra note 51, at *71. 
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Again, Marshall’s original construction of the original Crimes Act in 
Palmer would leave Furlong’s crimes against the English vessel beyond the 
Court’s reach, despite Congress’s clear competence under the Constitution 
and international law to punish it.  Furthermore, the Act of 1819 had shown 
that Congress desired to extend universal jurisdiction to classic piracy and 
probably had the same intention in the prior measure.  Thus, Justice John-
son, writing for the Court, invoked the Klintock fiction of statelessness—the 
idea that piratical vessels lose the privileges of national protection—to 
backtrack from Palmer’s difficult conclusion that piracy could not be pun-
ished on a universal basis.  The Court held in Furlong that a murder in 
which someone on a “stateless” vessel shot someone on a foreign vessel 
could be punished.223   
Recognizing the confusion caused by the statelessness fiction, the 
Court turned to Furlong’s final crime, a murder of a foreigner on a nonpi-
ratical foreign vessel.  Here, the Court laid down some clear lines.  An “of-
fence committed by a foreigner upon a foreigner in a foreign ship” is a 
matter in which Congress “ha[s] no right to interfere.”224  Such a case would 
go beyond the scope of “the punishing powers of the body that enacted 
it.”225  The Court distinguished between piracies at international law and 
other crimes.  Only the former, when committed among foreigners, fell 
“within the acknowledged reach of the punishing powers of Congress.”226  
This language seems to refer directly to Clause Ten, and the distinction be-
tween piracy and murder precisely tracks Clause Ten’s “Piracies and Felo-
nies” distinction: 
There exist well-known distinctions between the crimes of piracy and 
murder, both as to constituents and incidents.  Robbery on the seas is 
considered as an offence within the criminal jurisdiction of all na-
tions. . . .  Not so with the crime of murder.  It is an offence too abhor-
rent to the feelings of man, to have made it necessary that it also should 
have been brought within this universal jurisdiction.  And hence, pun-
ishing it when committed within the jurisdiction, or, (what is the same 
thing,) in the vessel of another nation, has not been acknowledged as a 
right.227  
By this reasoning, the test of what Congress can make universally cogniza-
ble is the law of nations.  Congress cannot expand its jurisdiction by calling 
crimes “piracies” when they do not have such a status in international law.  
Piracy and murder “are things so essentially different in their nature, that 
not even the omnipotence of legislative power can confound or identify 
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225  Id. at 196. 
226  Id. at 197. 
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them.”228  It would be harder to find clearer language expressing the view 
that this limit is inherent and nonderogable.229 
There are two parts to the Court’s opinion: one formal and the other 
structural.  First, Congress has power over piracies; that power can thus be 
exercised only consistent with its “well-known . . . constituents and inci-
dents.”230  Thus, presumably this special jurisdictional reach only extends to 
piracy and not to other crimes that Congress is authorized to punish.  Treat-
ing as identical things known to be different would simply be an “absurd-
ity.”231  The second argument is a reductio ad absurdum.  If Congress can 
punish anything universally by calling it piracy, “what offence might not be 
brought within their power by the same device?”232  The notion that Con-
gress could generally legislate as to crimes on foreign vessels was self-
evidently impossible.  This hearkened back to Marshall’s argument in the 
Robbins matter.   
4. United States v. Holmes.—Furlong’s dictum that Congress could 
reach murder on a stateless vessel was confirmed a few weeks later in the 
case of Holmes, involving a murder committed by a pirate crew onboard a 
vessel they had seized.233  The defendants were of mixed nationalities, and 
the nationality of the victim was unclear.  Justice Washington, in an exceed-
ingly terse opinion, held that what Klintock had said about robbery on state-
less vessels would be true of murder as well.  In particular, the murder of a 
foreigner by foreigners would be cognizable upon a “piratical” ship, but not 
upon a foreign one.234  But Furlong had stressed that murder and robbery 
are quite different.  The statelessness device in Klintock merely gave Con-
gress universal jurisdiction over sea robbery, which it possessed in interna-
tional law.  
Holmes seems to use the statelessness device to expand Congress’s 
reach beyond what had been previously allowed.  However, on its facts, it 
would be hard to say that Holmes lay outside traditional U.S. jurisdiction, 
and the entire universality discussion may have been unnecessary.  Circum-
stantial evidence strongly suggested that the pirate vessels were American; 
the identity of the captured ship and murdered person also remain obscure, 
but the victim too may well have been an American.235 
As a result of the scanty facts and reasoning, it is hard to know what to 
make of the Klintock and Holmes cases.  The Court may have taken the 
view, perhaps held by Lee and Iredell, that murder on the high seas was 
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universally cognizable under international law.  However, this would make 
the cases hard to square with Furlong and Palmer, both of which seem to 
reject this view.  Klintock and Holmes may represent a rather narrow excep-
tion to the requirement of a U.S. nexus, if they represent an exception at all.  
They may be about evidentiary rather than jurisdictional principles.  If U.S. 
jurisdiction does not extend to purely foreign crimes, what happens in a 
case where one simply cannot tell if the locus or victim was American or 
foreign?  Indeed, the Court explicitly explained its decision in Holmes as 
merely putting the burden of proof regarding foreign status on the defen-
dants.236  
Alternatively, if the ship were not American, Holmes could be an ex-
ample of supplemental or pendent universal jurisdiction.  A vessel only be-
comes stateless when it engages in piracy.  That offense clearly falls within 
Congress’s Piracies power.  At the same time, pirates are quite likely to 
commit murder, and given that the United States has jurisdiction over much 
of their conduct already, prosecuting the murder as well might not be seen 
as the establishment of a separate jurisdiction.  As piracy must be proven 
first, the jurisdiction over murder will generally be a moot question, given 
that a piracy conviction would promptly be fatal for the defendant.237  
Moreover, the cases could be understood as being examples of “pendent 
party” jurisdiction, given that some defendants were clearly American.  
This would be consistent with the treatment of the Hermione mutineers 
tried in Trenton.238 
D. Summary 
Taken together, these cases show that Congress can only apply its uni-
versal jurisdiction to piracy, which was universally cognizable under the 
law of nations.239  Allowing universal jurisdiction for simple felonies would 
 
236  Id. at 420. 
237  See Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 193 (noting that having sustained piracy conviction against 
defendant, it would not be necessary to consider jurisdiction over murder conviction, “as this conclusion 
decides his fate”). 
238  See supra text accompanying notes 160–169. 
239  Furlong and Palmer were apparently understood by contemporaries as constitutional holdings 
requiring a U.S. nexus for any prosecution under Clause Ten.  See United States v. Kessler, 26 F. Cas. 
766 (C.C.D. Pa. 1829) (No. 15,528) (declining universal jurisdiction over high seas murder).  United 
States v. Crawford, 25 F. Cas. 692 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1843) (No. 14,890), involved an international law 
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tion” has “gone further” than the Articles of Confederation by giving Congress power over “offenses 
against the law of nations” as well as “piracies and felonies committed on the high seas.”  Id. at 693.  
Yet this does not mean universal jurisdiction applies to the former: “[T]here can be no doubt that the 
character of the vessel must be proved to be American, and this court would not take jurisdiction of of-
fences committed on board of foreign ships.”  Id. at 694; see also Case of the Amistad—Surrender under 
Treaty with Spain, 3 Op. Att’y Gen. 484, 489 (1839) (“[U]nquestionably, that any offence committed on 
board [a Spanish vessel with no U.S. nexus] is cognizable before the Spanish tribunals, and not else-
where.”  (citing Smith and Palmer)). 
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expand the piracy power and blur the distinctions between the two catego-
ries.  In Palmer and Furlong, the Court distinguished between Congress’s 
power with regard to piracy and other crimes.  Palmer shows Marshall’s 
doubts about the nonrobbery provisions of the Crimes Act to have remained 
unchanged since he first expressed them in 1799, when he said a literal 
reading of the law would exceed Congress’s Define and Punish powers.  
Furlong held even more emphatically that Congress could not “extend the 
punishment for murder to the case of that offence committed by a foreigner 
upon a foreigner in a foreign ship.”240  Justice Johnson in both cases ex-
plained that Congress’s power to define had to have some correspondence 
to objective external definitions; Congress could not by fiat give the juris-
dictional status of piracy to an offense, like murder, that while universally 
condemned, was not subject to universal jurisdiction under international 
law.  A minority of jurists like Justice Iredell thought murder on the high 
seas was universally cognizable, though there was no support for this view 
in state practice.  This suggests that using the universal jurisdiction author-
ized by the Constitution requires more than a mere claim that an offense is 
universally cognizable in international law. 
The intermediate case of vessels without nationality has little bearing 
on the constitutional question.  The Court’s statelessness rulings appear to 
be an end-run around earlier statutory interpretations, or at most, an exten-
sion of piracy’s universal jurisdiction to other crimes arising out of the 
same “common nucleus of operative fact.”241  Statelessness was piracy by 
another name.  The set of stateless vessels—those having cast off claims of 
national protection—that the Court dealt with was largely if not entirely 
congruent with the set of piratical vessels.242  Thus, even after these deci-
sions, Congress could not declare non-American vessels stateless for the 
purpose of acquiring jurisdiction over nonpiratical or nonuniversal crimes.   
Indeed, subsequent courts saw Palmer as reading the statute in light of 
constitutional principles and did not understand Holmes to change these 
principles, even with regard to murder.  One court, in discussing the Crimes 
Act, observed that “[i]n but few of its provisions can it be taken literally” 
because “this would lead us to the punishment of murders committed on 
rivers in the heart of foreign countries by their own citizens or subjects.”243  
Such an outcome would be simply “absurd” because it exceeds the “juris-
diction of the United States.”244 
 
240  Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 197. 
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243  Anonymous Case, 1 F.Cas. 999, 1003 (C.C.D. Mo. 1843) (No. 447). 
244  Id. 
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V. THE SLAVE TRADE 
A. The Constitution in Congress 
A ban on the importation of slaves in America went into effect in 1808, 
the earliest date permitted by the Constitution.245  Beginning in 1807, Con-
gress took increasingly severe measures against the trade.  Bills against it 
enjoyed broad support.  This came from an increased awareness of the cru-
elty with which the trade was carried on, even among those who did not de-
sire abolition per se, as well as a robust “Baptists and bootleggers” coalition 
of Northern abolitionists and Southern slave owners not wanting to see the 
prices of their “property” undercut.  At the same time, European powers, 
though slower to legislate against it, had begun to denounce the trade. 
In 1820 Congress went further than it or any other nation had ever 
gone before by declaring the slave trade a form of piracy punishable by 
death.246  The statute applied to “any citizen of the United States” engaged 
in the slave trade on any vessel, or “any person whatever” engaged in the 
slave trade on a ship “owned in the whole or part . . . [by] any citizen or 
citizens of the United States.”247 Thus, while slavery had been dubbed pi-
ratical, Congress could only punish it to the extent that it had a demonstra-
ble U.S. nexus.248  In other words, Congress extended jurisdiction almost to 
the point of universal jurisdiction—but not further. 
The goal of the statute was two-fold.  First, it increased the penalties 
for importation into the United States.  Second, Congress had come to see 
the trade as an unmitigated evil, and American involvement in the trade hurt 
the “honor of the nation.”249  Thus, the statute also punished Americans traf-
ficking slaves from Africa to other countries.  Congress wanted to end the 
slave trade globally, out of humanitarian concerns, as the subsequent dip-
lomatic and ultimately military history bears out.  The report of the House 
Committee explained: 
 In proposing . . . to make such part of this offense as occurs upon the ocean, 
piracy, your committee are animated, not by the desire of manifesting to the 
world the horror with which it is viewed by the American people; but, by the 
 
245  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; Act of March 2, 1807, ch. 22, 2 Stat. 426. 
246  Act of May 15, 1820, ch. 113, §§ 4–5, 3 Stat. 600, 600–01. 
247  Id. 
248  Many of the cases brought under the Act revolved around whether either the citizenship or own-
ership requirements were satisfied.  See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 25 F. Cas. 1364, 1368 
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 15,231).  Before passports, when much of the U.S. population was made up 
of first or second generation immigrants, determining a defendant’s nationality was not easy, especially 
if he wished to obscure it.  Similarly, slave traders resorted to a variety of measures, such as fictitious 
sales and renaming, in order to hide their American connection.  As an element of the offense, the 
United States had to prove the jurisdictional requirements, and thus, defendants relied heavily on this 
point. 
249  36 ANNALS OF CONG. 2209 (1820) (concerning the report of the Committee on the Slave Trade). 
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confident expectation of promising, by this example, its more certain punish-
ment by all nations, and its absolute and final extinction.250 
While the statute designated it as piracy, slave trading was clearly not a vio-
lation of international law at the time.  It had not been recognized as univer-
sally cognizable, though several major maritime nations had banned it.251  
So in 1823 the House adopted, by a 131-9 majority and with the support of 
President Monroe, a resolution requesting the President 
to enter upon and prosecute . . . such negotiations with the several maritime 
powers . . . for the effectual abolition of the African slave trade, and its ulti-
mate denunciation as piracy, under the law of nations, by the consent of the 
civilized world.252 
Congress dubbed slavery as piracy precisely to catalyze a progressive de-
velopment in the law of nations, but understood that this development could 
take decades to mature.  It was understood that without the general assent of 
nations, slave trading could be called piracy but could not take on its juris-
dictional aspects.253  The next year, in negotiating an anti-slaving conven-
tion with Britain, Monroe made it an “indispensable condition” that 
Parliament label the trade as piracy.254  
Congress wanted to legislate against the trade as far is it could.  Indeed, 
to the extent that the goal was to abolish the global trade, a jurisdictionally 
limited law would ensure unusually severe punishments to fellow Ameri-
cans, while simply shifting business to the fleets of other less scrupulous 
nations.  To those who saw the death penalty as a steep but proper price to 
pay for the suppression of the trade, such a consequence would be hard on 
Americans without accomplishing the global goal.  
International law had not yet made the trade universally cognizable and 
thus a broader and perhaps more effective jurisdiction was impossible.  De-
spite its strong desire to do so, Congress felt that it could not legislate on a 
purely universal basis unless the offense had truly acquired the status of pi-
racy through the practice of nations.  The report on the bill from the House 
Committee on the Slave Trade demonstrates that this limitation was not 
seen as one deriving from international law in proprio vigore, but rather 
 
250  Id. at 2209–10. 
251  The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825); WHEATON, supra note 97, at 169 n.85.  As late as  
the 1840s, with the formation of a U.S.-British naval squadron for interdicting slave ships off the coast 
of Africa, the Admiralty instructed British vessels only to board British vessels, or those of nations with 
whom London had particular treaties.  “You are, however, to bear in mind,” the captains were in-
structed, “that Great Britain claims no rights whatever with respect to foreign ships engaged in that traf-
fic.”  Instructions for the Guidance of Her Majesty’s Naval Officers Employed in the Suppression of the 
Slave Trade, § 1, ¶ 1 (1844). 
252  3 EXECUTIVE JOURNAL OF THE SENATE, 1789–1875, at 381 (Feb. 28, 1823). 
253  Id. 
254  Id. at 382. 
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from the enumerated powers in Article I.255  Charles Fenton Mercer of Vir-
ginia, the head of the committee and an indefatigable crusader against the 
slave trade, discussed the objection that the 1820 law could only effect a 
“partial” end to the slave trade.  His report replied that “the Constitutional 
power of the Government has already been exercised in defining the crime 
of piracy” as far as it could, given that the slave trade had yet to become 
universally cognizable.256  It continued: 
Such is the unavoidable consequence of any exercise of the authority of Con-
gress, to define and punish this crime.  The definition and punishment can bind 
the United States alone.257 
This view was apparently supported by the Administration, which noted 
that the United States dubbed the slave trade piracy only “in relation to 
themselves,” because “they are bound, by the injunctions of their constitu-
tion to execute it, [only] so far as it respects the punishment of their own 
citizens . . . .”258  Congress’s failure to extend universal jurisdiction to slave 
trading is significant evidence of how it understood the constitutional limits 
on its Clause Ten powers.  Congress obviously desired to treat the offense 
on a universal basis, and therefore the refusal to do so can be taken with the 
seriousness of a statement against interest. 
Congress understood that simply calling an offense “piracy” could not 
give it the jurisdictional reach it had over piracy as defined by international 
law.  It sought to eventually establish the trade as a violation of interna-
tional law; already many nations had banned or condemned it.259  But in the 
meantime, Congress did not think it could exercise universal jurisdiction 
under the “Offenses” provision either, because the prohibition had not been 
firmly established in the law of nations.  In short, only if the conduct were a 
universally cognizable offense in international law did the committee feel it 
could cast a universal net.  Such legislative restraint, exercised by men who 
had seen the Constitution adopted in their lifetime, may be the best evi-
dence available as to the clause’s scope. 
However, even dubbing the trade “piracy” without punishing it univer-
sally raised some questions about the scope of the Define and Punish 
power.  Some congressmen objected that piracy was an offense with well-
defined elements; the slave trade was just a different offense.  Thus, the lat-
ter could not be made equivalent to the former.260  This argument may be 
 
255  See 36 ANNALS OF CONG. 2209 (1820).  
256  Id. at 2210 (emphasis added). 
257  Id. 
258  Letter from John Quincy Adams to Stratford Canning (June 24, 1823), in 42 ANNALS OF CONG. 
3015 (1823); see also WHEATON, supra note 94, at 109–10.  
259  WHEATON, supra note 97, §§ 125–26, at 165–69. 
260  See 40 ANNALS OF CONG. 1150 (1823) (statement of Rep. Mercer) (“[T]echnical objections have 
been urged, and sneers have been indulged against the legal accuracy of the application of the term pi-
racy to this offense.”). 
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disingenuous, a rhetorical sally by a minority of Southern legislators fearful 
of any restrictions on the slave industry.261  On its merits, the objection is 
silly.  Just because Congress called the offense piracy in the statute does not 
mean it used its Piracies power: it did not make the slave trade universally 
cognizable, and thus did not actually treat it like piracy.  The 1820 Act was 
an exercise of the Felonies power.  It is hard to imagine that the Constitu-
tion restricts the names that Congress can attach to offenses.  
B. The Antelope 
The Antelope began with the seizure of Spanish and Portuguese slave 
ships by American warships.262  Spain and Portugal sued in federal court for 
the restoration of the slaves, while the U.S. government sought to free them.  
The libellants argued that the United States could not liberate the slaves 
both because the trade did not violate international law and because such a 
seizure was not authorized by U.S. law.  Congressman Charles Ingersoll, 
appearing on behalf of the Iberian states, made the constitutional argument 
explicit.  Noting that Congress had not extended the Act of 1820 to foreign-
ers on foreign vessels, he suggested that such an extension, if made, would 
exceed its constitutional powers.263  This of course was precisely what his 
colleague in the House, Representative Mercer, had said at the time.264 
Chief Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court, ruled for the li-
bellants, but his discussion did not clearly disentangle the international and 
constitutional strands.  Marshall’s opinion rested primarily on international 
law and general principles, which apply directly in maritime cases.  As 
precedent, he primarily cited a recent British admiralty decision, Le Louis, 
involving similar facts.  In the opinion, it was not clear whether the prohibi-
tion on universal jurisdiction came solely from international law or from the 
Constitution.  While admitting the evil of the slave trade, he held that a pro-
hibitory norm had not won the consent of all civilized nations.265  In particu-
lar, because slave trading had not become piracy in international law: 
 
261  This may be loosely inferred from the resurrection of this argument by Representative James 
Lindsay Seward of Georgia, shortly before the Civil War.  He argued that the Define and Punish Clause 
could not have included the slave trade because the Constitution clearly accepted the legality of the slave 
trade, and it could hardly have tolerated piracy.  But in criticizing the 1820 statute, he admitted that the 
statute’s piracy label was a slap at the South: 
To declare the African slave trade piracy, is a reproach upon the institution itself. . . .  As the law 
now stands, it can only be considered as the judgment of the nation against the institution itself.  
The South suffers under this reproach. 
CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. app. 248, 250 (1859) (Speech of Hon. J.L. Seward). 
262  23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 67–68 (1825). 
263  Id. at 104–05 (“The United States have done all in their power, consistently with their constitu-
tion, to abolish the trade.”). 
264  See 36 ANNALS OF CONG. 2210 (1820). 
265  See Antelope, 23 U.S. at 111–12. 
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It can be made so only by statute; and the obligation of the statute cannot tran-
scend the legislative power of the state which may enact it.   
 If it be neither repugnant to the law of nations, nor piracy, it is almost su-
perfluous to say in this Court, that the right of bringing in for adjudication in 
time of peace, even where the vessel belongs to a nation which has prohibited 
the trade, cannot exist.266 
The reference to “the legislative power” could be understood as refer-
ring to Congress’s enumerated powers,267 but could also refer to the pre-
scriptive jurisdiction of states in international law.  But it is certain that, in 
the vigorously argued and much publicized case, no one contradicted Inger-
soll’s view that if the slave trade was not universally cognizable in interna-
tional law, Congress lacked the constitutional power to punish it. 
CONCLUSION 
Neither the “Felonies” nor the “Offenses against the Law of Nations” 
powers give Congress a blank check for universal jurisdiction legislation.  
They may allow universal jurisdiction over piracy alone, or at most, over 
offenses currently treated as universal by the law of nations.  This conclu-
sion is supported by the rulings of the Supreme Court in the few cases ad-
dressing the question, the elaborately expressed argument of John Marshall, 
the self-restraint of Congress in the criminalization of the slave trade, and 
numerous statements by leading jurists of the early Republic.  Only two 
figures—Iredell and Lee—thought that universal jurisdiction could extend 
to other atrocious crimes on the high seas.  Set against those two are Wil-
son, Marshall, Story, John Quincy Adams, St. George Tucker, and others.  
Certainly Marshall’s and Story’s views bear particular weight here, not only 
because of their stature in constitutional interpretation, but also because one 
cannot suspect them of hostility to sweeping interpretations of federal 
power.  Furthermore, Iredell’s and Lee’s views can be understood as dis-
agreements about what crimes were universally cognizable in international 
law or the acceptability of pendent universal jurisdiction.  In any event, 
Marshall’s logic prevailed in Congress in 1799 and—due to his position on 
the Court—thereafter.  There are no echoes of Iredell’s view in any judicial 
decision or in the period after 1800 generally.  In the absence of explicit 
discussion of the clause’s jurisdictional scope in the drafting or ratification 
process, the support for Marshall’s position seems overwhelming. 
What this means for the scope of universal jurisdiction under Clause 
Ten today depends on how one thinks terms in the Constitution that refer to 
international law should be understood when international law changes 
greatly over time.  First, does the mention of piracy make it the only univer-
 
266  Id. at 122–23. 
267  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress 
. . . .”).  
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sal jurisdiction offense Congress can ever create, or does it allow Congress 
to punish whatever the international law of the time makes universally pun-
ishable, and thus treats as a piracy?  Because Clause Ten specifically names 
piracy, rather than referring to the concept of universal jurisdiction, a pure 
textualist or original meaning view would limit application of such jurisdic-
tion under Clause Ten exclusively to piracy.  To be sure, the Framers rec-
ognized that the law of nations could change over time.  But this cuts both 
ways.  If the expansion of universal jurisdiction to other crimes could be an-
ticipated, the singling out of piracy could suggest a choice to limit universal 
jurisdiction to that crime.  Such a result would not lead to absurd conse-
quences.  For one, Congress could still use treaties to achieve universal ju-
risdiction or something close to it; almost all legislation providing for 
universal jurisdiction has been enacted pursuant to recently signed multilat-
eral conventions.268  Furthermore, universal jurisdiction is so rarely used by 
nations that such a jurisdictional limitation could hardly be thought of as a 
significant disability.  
A broader view of Clause Ten would see it as limiting universal juris-
diction to those crimes that in the law of nations take on the then-unique ju-
risdictional character of piracy.  In other words, “Piracies” need not lock the 
Constitution into the law of nations circa 1789.  This would doom the Con-
stitution to awkward anachronism, given that customary doctrines are 
meant to be organic.  Updating “Piracies” would include offenses that to-
day’s law of nations treats as universally cognizable, such as genocide and 
crimes against humanity.269  More generally, because this position takes the 
international law of the present day as its standard, it would allow punish-
ment of Clause Ten crimes to track expanding international notions of ju-
risdiction.  Today’s international rules of jurisdiction are considerably less 
formalistic and more effects-based than those of the eighteenth century.  
Thus, if international law has come to recognize a flexible territorial-effects 
jurisdiction or passive personality jurisdiction—which were unknown at the 
time of the Framing—that would define the new limit on Congress’s power 
over high seas felonies and crimes against the law of nations. 
Some evidence from the early Republic supports the evolutionary un-
derstanding of international law terms.  In enacting the 1820 law designat-
ing the slave trade as piracy, Congress thought that universal jurisdiction 
could not apply because it had not yet become a universal jurisdiction of-
fense in international law.  However, Congress and the Administration as-
sumed that the United States could punish it universally after it got added to 
 
268  See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
269  See Meyler, supra note 36, at 595–98 (arguing for updating meaning of common law terms 
found in the Constitution).  
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the international list of universal jurisdiction crimes.270  In 1822 and 1823 
the House passed resolutions calling for the President to work towards ob-
taining the agreement of other nations to treat the trade as piracy.  The im-
plicit premise was that Congress could then punish it as a Clause Ten 
piracy.271  This suggests a broadly shared understanding that piracy itself is 
not the only possible “piracy” for Define and Punish Clause purposes.272  
One aspect of the debate muddies the lessons that can be learned from 
this episode.  When it was urged that the slave trade could not be made 
equivalent to piracy by statute because it was not piracy by definition, the 
supporters of the statute responded that the slave trade did fit within the es-
tablished international law definition of piracy.  It involved robbery—the 
stealing of people—committed on the high seas.273  This response could be 
read to suggest that the statute’s supporters were not fully confident that the 
piracy power extended beyond classical piracy.  But it was more likely a 
quick rejoinder to silence the critics, while still emphasizing the savagery of 
the slave trade.  Because the statute purposefully did not make it universally 
recognizable, the criticism was weak and rejoinder unnecessary. 
Colonel Mercer made a highly positivist argument that piracy can be 
whatever international law says it is: “The law of nations is in part natural; 
in part conventional.  Its only sanction is to be found in the physical force, 
its legal authority in the . . . consent of nations.  The consent of nations may 
make piracy of any offence upon the high seas.”274  The Monroe Admini-
 
270  See 36 ANNALS OF CONG. 2210 (1820) (noting that punishment of the slave trade as piracy 
would, “for a time at least,” be confined to U.S. citizens, and suggesting that once the offense became 
universally cognizable, it could be punished more broadly). 
271  40 ANNALS OF CONG. 1149–50 (1823) (“Let the African slave trade be denounced to be piracy 
under the law of nations by the consent of the maritime powers of Europe and America, and . . . [a]ll na-
tions will have authority to detect, to punish it, to hunt it down.”); Letter from John Quincy Adams to 
Stratford Canning, supra note 258 (suggesting that the United States would be able to treat the slave 
trade as piracy when it attains such status in international law); Letter from John Quincy Adams to 
Richard Rush (June 24, 1823), in 42 ANNALS OF CONG. 3020 (1824) (“The resolution . . . recommends 
negotiation, to obtain the consent of the civilized world to recognise it as piracy, under the law of na-
tions.  One of the properties of that description of piracies is, that those who are guilty of it may be . . . 
tried by the courts of every nation.”); Letter from A.H. Everett to Baron de Nagell (Nov. 7, 1823), in 42 
ANNALS OF CONG. 3035 (1824) (making clear the U.S. desire to punish the offense universally when it 
achieved such status in international law). 
272  The efforts to establish universal jurisdiction over the slave trade, and their relation to British 
proposals to establish international courts for the offense, are discussed further in Eugene Kontorovich, 
The Constitutionality of International Courts: The Forgotten Precedent of Slave Trade Tribunals 
(Northwestern Pub. Law Research Paper No. 09-06, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1340645. 
273  See 40 ANNALS OF CONG. 1150 (1823) (“And is it not robbery to seize, not the property of the 
man, but the man himself . . . ?”); 36 ANNALS OF CONG. 2209 (1820) (“Are [piracy and the slave trade] 
not united in this offence all that is most iniquitous in theft, most daring in robbery, and cruel in mur-
der?”); see also Letter from A.H. Everett to Baron de Nagell, supra note 271, at 3034 (“In fact, this pre-
tend commerce bears all the characteristics of piracy . . . .”). 
274  40 ANNALS OF CONG. 1150 (1823). 
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stration, which in 1823 petitioned other nations to agree to making the trade 
piracy, also seemed to think that the United States would then be able to 
punish it.275  On the whole, most seemed to think it possible to use the Con-
stitution’s Piracies power against new international crimes on the high 
seas.276   
On the other hand, much constitutional tradition counsels against up-
dating the content of “Piracies.”  Many constitutional concepts lock in the 
common law at the time of the Founding.  The question of when one gets a 
jury turns largely on eighteenth-century distinctions between law and equity 
that have long been abandoned in modern procedure.277  Habeas jurispru-
dence sees the Constitution as implicitly locking in the writ as it existed in 
the eighteenth century, even though one might imagine the common law 
evolving to change, and reduce, the availability of habeas.  Instead, habeas 
with all its anachronisms—such as the requirement of, and limitation to, 
cases of confinement—is by and large maintained.  Similarly, while the 
common law of nations in 1789 recognized broad sovereign immunity, one 
can imagine this changing over time.  Indeed, today states enjoy broader 
immunity in certain respects than do foreign nations because the former’s 
immunity is locked in the often difficult to determine 1791 law, while the 
latter remains extra-constitutional common law, and thus subject to judicial 
and legislative limitation.278 
A final “updating” question relates to the standard for determining 
whether an offense has become universally cognizable.  The traditional 
definition of customary international law required clear, repeated, and near 
universal state practice to establish a norm.  This standard may be higher 
than one under which offenses are dubbed “universal” in contemporary 
scholarship and some jurisprudence.  Today, norms are often proclaimed as 
universal jurisdiction without broad state practice; proclamations and reso-
lutions are used in place of longstanding national conduct.279  Here, the 
slave trade example cuts against updating.  At the time, the slave trade was 
widely condemned by European nations through nonbinding proclama-
tions.280  Thus there is nothing new about “soft law.”  Yet Mercer’s report 
 
275  See 42 ANNALS OF CONG. 3027–35 (1824). 
276  Because Congress never did extend universal jurisdiction to the slave trade, this precedent is 
suggestive but hardly conclusive. 
277  See Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).  
278  Compare Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Sch. Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 
(1999) (holding that states retain sovereign immunity when participating in the market in commercial 
activity), with Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C § 1605(a)(2) (2006) (eliminating the immu-
nity of foreign nations to suits “based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the 
foreign state”). 
279  See, e.g., Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding torture to be universally 
cognizable on grounds that all states condemned it, despite massive state practice to the contrary). 
280  At the Congress of Vienna in 1815, Great Britain, Austria, France, Portugal, Prussia, Spain, and 
Sweden all denounced the slave trade in strong terms.  Most of those nations, as well as Holland and the 
United States, had also begun banning the trade in various degrees, with several nations forbidding it 
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takes the position that Congress could only treat as a piracy conduct that na-
tions universally treated as within universal jurisdiction. 
Indeed, the degree of international consensus as to universal jurisdic-
tion over piracy was complete, long-standing, and realized in practice.  To 
be even roughly analogous, a modern international law crime should corre-
spond on those dimensions.  Yet the constitutional nature of the distinction 
between “Piracies” and other crimes suggests that it should take real state 
practice to render an act piracy.  If the Supreme Court’s piracy cases stand 
for anything, it is that Congress cannot grant itself universal jurisdiction by 
calling an act piracy when such an act does not objectively enjoy such a 
status in international law.  Obviously the freedom to call something uni-
versally cognizable based on soft law makes it easier for Congress to make 
“Offenses” into “Piracies.”  Indeed, Furlong’s rejection of murder as piracy 
suggests that the Define and Punish clause requires more than just universal 
condemnation for universal jurisdiction.  
 
 * * * 
 
Taking together the treaty power and a broad evolutionary view of “Pi-
racies,” Congress could reach most of what it would likely want to punish 
through universal jurisdiction.  Yet even here there are limits, such as when 
Congress tries to reach matters clearly of lesser concern to international law 
(like drug smuggling) or tries to anticipate the development of international 
law norms, and attaches universal jurisdiction to offenses where the rele-
vant treaties or state practice has not done so.  Each statute must be ana-
lyzed individually to determine whether the conduct is universally 
cognizable in international law, as well as the existence of other potential 
bases of congressional power.281 
Some statutes seem to have gone too far.  The biggest (and only) font 
of universal jurisdiction prosecutions is the MDLEA.  Yet drug trafficking 
is not generally understood to be a universal jurisdiction offense.282  The 
new Narco-Terrorism Act extends American drug law to conduct with no 
U.S. nexus.  Drug distribution is not an international crime at all, let alone a 
universally cognizable one.283  Furthermore, neither the relevant interna-
                                                                                                                           
entirely and immediately.  See WHEATON, supra note 97, §§ 125–26, at 165–69; see also The Antelope, 
23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, app. at 27 (1825) (describing European measures against the slave trade).  
281  See Kontorovich, supra note †. 
282  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 (1987) (not including drug traf-
ficking in list of offenses recognized internationally as of universal concern); PRINCETON PRINCIPLES OF 
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 48 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2001) (explaining that drug crimes “were raised as 
candidates for inclusion” in the list of serious crimes subject to universal jurisdiction, but were not ulti-
mately selected).  
283  At least some observers have expressed doubts about Congress’s Article I power to exercise 
universal jurisdiction over narco-terrorism.  See BRIAN T. YEH & CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., USA PATRIOT IMPROVEMENT AND REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2005: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 28 
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tional conventions nor state practice suggest that universal jurisdiction ex-
ists over the use of child soldiers.284  Finally, the Alien Tort Statute has been 
used as a basis of civil universal jurisdiction over a variety of wrongs with 
no connection to the United States.  This Article shows Congress’s Article I 
authority under the Define and Punish Clause requires that the conduct it 
punishes either have some connection to the United States, or else be piracy 
or some other offense clearly treated as universally cognizable through the 
general consent of nations—if one accepts that clause’s meaning tracks 
changes in international law.  Because the requirement that the conduct be 
universally cognizable under international law is a constitutional limitation 
in ATS cases, it suggests that courts should be surer of conduct’s universal 
jurisdiction status than perhaps would be necessary if the limitation was 
statutory or prudential. 
                                                                                                                           
n.110 (2006) (“In cases where neither the support, the drug offense, nor the terrorism have any connec-
tion to the U.S. other than the later presences of the offender here, paragraph 960A(b)(5) may exceed 
Congress’s legislative reach unless the benefit of a treaty obligation can be claimed.”). 
284  See Child Soldiers Accountability Act of 2008, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2442(c)(3) (West 2008). 
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